Flight from urban blight: lead poisoning, crime and suburbanization by Curci, Federico & Masera, Federico
 
FLIGHT FROM URBAN BLIGHT: 
LEAD POISONING, CRIME AND SUBURBANIZATION 
Federico Curci, Federico Masera  







IEB Working Paper 2018/09 
FLIGHT FROM URBAN BLIGHT: 
LEAD POISONING, CRIME AND SUBURBANIZATION 
 






The Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB) is a research centre at the University of 
Barcelona (UB) which specializes in the field of applied economics. The IEB is a 
foundation funded by the following institutions: Applus, Abertis, Ajuntament de 
Barcelona, Diputació de Barcelona, Gas Natural, La Caixa and Universitat de 
Barcelona. 
 
The Cities Research Program has as its primary goal the study of the role of cities as 
engines of prosperity. The different lines of research currently being developed address 
such critical questions as the determinants of city growth and the social relations 
established in them, agglomeration economies as a key element for explaining the 
productivity of cities and their expectations of growth, the functioning of local labour 
markets and the design of public policies to give appropriate responses to the current 
problems cities face. The Research Program has been made possible thanks to support 
from the IEB Foundation and the UB Chair in Smart Cities (established in 2015 by 




Institut d’Economia de Barcelona 
Facultat d’Economia i Empresa 
Universitat de Barcelona 
C/ John M. Keynes, 1-11 
(08034) Barcelona, Spain 





The IEB working papers represent ongoing research that is circulated to encourage 
discussion and has not undergone a peer review process. Any opinions expressed here 




IEB Working Paper 2018/09 
FLIGHT FROM URBAN BLIGHT: 
LEAD POISONING, CRIME AND SUBURBANIZATION * 
 




ABSTRACT:  In the post World War II period, most U.S. cities experienced large 
movements of population from the city centers to the suburbs. In this paper we provide 
causal evidence that this process of suburbanization can be explained by the rise of violent 
crime in city centers. We do so by proposing a new instrument to exogenously predict 
violent crime. This instrument uses as time variation the U.S. national levels of lead 
poisoning. Cross-sectional variation comes from a proxy for soil quality, which explains the 
fate of lead in soil and its subsequent bioavailability. Using data for more than 300 U.S. 
cities, results show that the increase in violent crime from the level in 1960 to its maximum 
in 1991 decreased the proportion of people living in city centers by 15 percentage points. 
This increase in crime moved almost 25 million people to the suburbs. As a result of 
suburbanization, we find that people remaining in the city center are more likely to be black 
people, consistent with the “white flight" phenomenon. We then demonstrate that this 
suburbanization process had aggregate effects on the city. Exploiting a spatial equilibrium 
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In the last century, both developed and developing countries experienced at the same
time two important urban phenomena: urbanization and suburbanization. Urban-
ization refers to the movement of people from rural to urban areas. Suburbanization
represents the movement of population from city centers to low density suburban ar-
eas. The increase in the number of people living in the suburbs is not just caused by
city growth, as shown by Angel et al. (2011). U.S. cities provide an emblematic exam-
ple of this suburbanization process. According to Baum-Snow (2007), U.S. population
living in city centers declined by 17 percent between 1950 and 1990 despite popula-
tion growth of 72 percent in metropolitan areas.
The advantages and drawbacks of city growth have been largely studied. Urban-
ization reflects agglomeration economies and higher productivities. At the same time,
large cities might suffer congestions and urban distress. In particular, crime is higher
in bigger cities (Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999). The movement of people from city cen-
ters to suburbs can underline the negative effects of density. In this paper we provide
novel causal evidence for a mechanism that links the increase in violent crimes in U.S.
city centers between the 1960s and the 1990s to suburbanization. We then show the
consequences of this reallocation of people within cities in terms of racial segregation,
and overall city productivity and amenities. Suburbanization of people has implica-
tions in terms of congestions and transport costs, decreasing amenities in cities. It
also affects location of firms and then city productivity. Therefore, in this paper we
show that suburbanization is crucial to explain how city structure can influence pro-
ductivity and amenities externalities offered by cities, something that has received the
attention of a limited number of studies.
While in 1960, 43% of the urban population in the U.S. was living in city centers,
this proportion dropped to 33% in 1990. In this paper, we argue that the amenity value
of city centers in the U.S. decreased because of crime, leading people to suburbanize.
In fact, U.S. cities experienced a dramatic increase in violent crimes at the same time
that population suburbanized (see Figure 1(a)). The violent crimes rate rose from 23
crimes per 10,000 inhabitants in 1960 to 163 crimes per 10,000 inhabitants in 1991.
Similarly, cities in which violent crime increased the most had the strongest decrease
in proportion of people living in city centers (see Figure 1(b)). When crime rates de-
creased, after 1991, the general trend for suburbanization did not revert.1
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
The goal of this research is to provide causal evidence and to quantify the effect of
crime on suburbanization. We do so by proposing a new instrument to exogenously
predict violent crime rate in the city centers of all U.S. cities. The time variation of our
instrument is provided by U.S. national levels of lead consumption. Medical litera-
ture recognizes that exposure to lead as a child alters the formation of the brain and
increases aggressive behaviour in adulthood. We exploit the specific timing of the ef-
fect of lead on crime to be sure that we are not capturing the effect that lead might
have on other outcomes. Lead emissions by cars in the U.S. increased dramatically
1There are some recent studies that provide evidence of the return of some categories of population
to city centers, in particular white people with college degree (see Baum-Snow and Hartley, 2016 for a
review). However, these individuals represent a small proportion of the U.S. population.
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until 1972, and 19 years later crime rates reached their peak. Given that our identifi-
cation strategy takes advantage of this increase in lead exposure, we concentrate our
analysis on the period between 1960 and 1991. Lead emissions by cars accumulate in
the soil and then can be ingested by humans via soil resuspension. We obtain geo-
graphical variation for our instrument by exploiting the chemical literature evidence
showing that lead bioavailability to humans increases when lead deposits in soils of a
particular pH level. We use this information to instrument violent crime rates using
the interaction between the lagged national level of tetraethyl lead used in cars and a
function of the pH of the soil. We construct this instrument using machine learning
techniques as described in Section 4.2.
We estimate the effect of violent crime on suburbanization using a newly assem-
bled database for more than 300 U.S. cities. Our results show that the increase in
violent crimes from the level of 1960 to their maximum in 1991 was responsible for
a decrease in the proportion of people living in city centers by 15 percentage points.
Increases in violent crime led more than 25 million people to leave city centers. How-
ever, we encounter that the increase in crime rate did not change the total city pop-
ulation. Higher crime rates in the city centers drove people to relocate within cities
but not between cities. We also find that this suburbanization process was associated
with the so-called "white flight". As a city center became more violent, white people
moved to the suburbs, leading to an increase in the percentage of black people in the
city center. Moreover, we provide evidence that the increase in violent crime was not
only responsible for residential suburbanization but also it induced firms to leave city
centers and locate in the outskirts of the city. Employment decentralization followed
residential suburbanization and not the opposite. These results are confirmed after
several robustness and specification tests.
After showing that violent crime had an effect on the distribution of people and
firms inside a city we explore whether this phenomenon generated aggregate effects
at the city level. In addition to finding that violent crime did not decrease the over-
all population of the city, we prove that violent crime increased both house prices
and median incomes. To rationalize these city-aggregate results, we estimate a spa-
tial equilibrium model, based on Glaeser (2008), in which people decide in which city
to locate and in equilibrium utility should be equalized between cities. We assume
that violent crime can affect city amenities and productivity. We exploit the model
to map reduced form elasticities of the effect of violent crime on house prices, wages
and total city population, to structural parameters that describe the effect that vio-
lent crime has on city amenities and productivity. We find that higher violent crime
rates and the consequent relocation of people inside a city decrease city amenities
but increase overall city productivity. Our structural estimates imply that the increase
in violent crime in the city center between 1960 and 1991 led to a decrease in the av-
erage amenities of the city of 23.2%. We provide suggestive evidence that the effect of
crime on productivity is entirely caused by the effect that crime has on employment
decentralization.
This paper first contributes to the literature about the determinants of suburban-
ization. Several reasons have been identified as contributors of the suburbanization
of U.S. cities. Causal evidence of the effect of highways on suburbanization has been
3
provided by Baum-Snow (2007).2 Brueckner and Rosenthal (2009) argue that subur-
banization is explained by the fact that high-income households have higher demand
for newer housing stock, which develops faster in suburban locations. Boustan (2010)
shows that the large migration of black population from the rural South of the U.S. led
to whites leaving the cities. Reber (2005) provides evidence that white flight has been
stronger in districts with court-ordered desegregation plans.3 Several early studies
have more generally related urban blight to the flight from city centers.4
We show that the increase in crime rates from the 1960s to the 1990s is an impor-
tant reason for U.S. suburbanization. According to our estimates, the relative increase
in crime between city centers and suburbs from 1960 to 1991 implies a 35% decrease
in the population of city centers. We can compare this result to similar numbers in
the literature. Baum-Snow (2007) provides evidence that the construction of the in-
terstate highway system reduced the population of city centers by 23%. The effect of
the great black migration has been estimated to cause a drop in 17% in city center
population (Boustan, 2010). In this paper, we demonstrate that the effect of violent
crime has important complementarities with these other mechanisms. In fact, we
show that the increase in violent crime rates increased the construction of highways
and decreased the white population in the city centers, which consecutively further
influenced suburbanization. We also find that the suburbanization caused by crime is
stronger in cities with more blacks in the city center and in cities with more highways.
The link between crime and relocation of people has been the object of study
of a limited amount of analyses. Cullen and Levitt (1999) were the first to causally
consider the relationship between crime rates and city population. Their empirical
strategy consists of analyzing the effect on a city center population of crime rates in-
strumented by the lagged changes in the punitiveness of the state criminal justice
system and controlling for city and year fixed effects and several city characteristics.
They conclude that the decrease in city population because of increased crime rates
is mainly due to people migrating out of the city center. Our work differs from Cullen
and Levitt (1999) because we exploit exogenous variation at a much finer geographi-
cal level of observations that do not correlate with any potential suburbanization con-
founding mechanism at city level.
Our findings relate to the growing literature on optimal city structure. These stud-
ies rely on the classical urban models developed by Alonso (1964), Mills (1972), and
Muth (1969), and subsequently expanded by Fujita and Ogawa (1982), Lucas and
Rossi-Hansberg (2002), Ahlfeldt et al. (2015), and Allen et al. (2015). Our work also
connects to studies about how urban amenities change in response to urban shape
and crime. The cornerstone of these works is the spatial equilibrium concept intro-
duced by the seminal works by Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982), and then reviewed
by Glaeser (2008) and Moretti (2011). Similar to our work, Harari (2015) estimates
the externality effects of urban compactness. Diamond (2016) shows that crime is an
2Similar evidence has been found for the case of Spain (Garcia-Lopez et al., 2015) and other Euro-
pean countries (Garcia-Lopez et al., 2015). Similarly, Glaeser and Kahn (2004) and Kopecky and Suen
(2010) relate suburbanization to car adoption.
3This last result was not confirmed by Baum-Snow and Lutz (2011) who find that school desegrega-
tion affected only out-of-city migration and not within-city suburbanization.
4See, for example, Bradford and Kelejian (1973), Frey (1979), Grubb (1982), Mieszkowski and Mills
(1993), and Mills and Lubuele (1997). Cullen and Levitt (1999) look specifically at the role of crime.
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important component of urban amenities, which then influences location of people.
We contribute to these literatures by showing that the effect of crime on employment
decentralization creates externalities over city amenity and productivity.
Our paper also contributes to a long-standing stream of literature that studies the
determinants of violence and crime.5 In particular, we relate to the strand of this liter-
ature that studies the biological determinants of violence. As reviewed by Rowe (2002)
and O’Flaherty and Sethi (2015) there is a growing body of evidence on how genetic,
medical and environmental factors may increase the propensity of violent behavior.
In particular, we build on a medical literature that has shown how lead poisoning is
a potent neurotoxin that is closely related to aggressive and violent behavior. In eco-
nomics, there is a new and growing stream of literature that studies the relationship
between lead poisoning and crime (see Section 4.1 for a review of the literature). We
contribute to this literature by exploiting a new source of cross-sectional variation
given by the type of soil in a city. We then use this new instrument to provide causal
evidence of the effect lead poisoning from resuspended lead has on violent crime.
Moreover, we contribute to the literature that studies the effects of crime. Here,
the literature has mainly focused on the detrimental effects that a violent environ-
ment has on the young, especially when it comes to their educational decisions (Bowen
and Bowen, 1999; Henrich et al., 2004). Another important strand of the literature has
instead looked at the effects crime has on economic activity, mainly by deterring in-
vestments (Daniele and Marani, 2011; Detotto and Otranto, 2010). In this paper, we
provide causal evidence of the effects that crime has on suburbanization and how this
shapes the location of people inside a city.
Finally, our work is one application of machine learning for construction of in-
strumental variables (see Athey and Imbens, 2017 for a review). We select a proxy of
soil quality between a large set of possible alternatives using an algorithm that finds
the instrument that maximizes the relevance condition. We run the first stage of our
regression for any possible interval of soil pH and we select the interval that maxi-
mizes the F-statistics. We then show how the pH of the soil selected by this algorithm
conforms to what is expected by the chemical literature. We argue that the soil qual-
ity index selected is in line with the identification assumption required for exogeneity
and we show that the results are robust to the use of other proxies.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical strategy to
obtain the causal effect of crime on suburbanization. Section 3 describes the data
used. The instrumental variable and the identifying assumptions are explained in
Section 4. Empirical results are reported and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 exam-
ines the possible threats to identification and provide evidence of the robustness of
the results. In Section 7, we present the spatial equilibrium model and estimates of
the externality effects of crime rates on amenities and productivity. Lastly, Section 8
concludes.
5Most of the efforts in this literature have been concentrated in assessing the effect of police, in-
carceration and the judicial system on the criminal activity (for the most recent literature review, see
Chalfin and McCrary, 2017). Another strand of the literature instead has been focused on how different
social and economic circumstances may affect crime. Examples of these determinants are income in-
equality (Kelly, 2000), immigration (Bianchi et al., 2012), gun laws (Ludwig, 1998) and social cohesion
(Goudriaan et al., 2006) among many others.
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2 Empirical strategy
The empirical model we want to estimate is reported in Equation 1. Our objective is
to understand the effect of the increase in violent crimes per capita (VC) in the city
center (cc) of one metropolitan area (m) in a particular year (t) on the suburbaniza-
tion of that city. The proxy for suburbanization (subm,t ) we use is the proportion of
population living in the city center (popcc ) over the total city population, which is
the sum of the population in the city center and in the suburbs (popncc ). In order
to control for unobserved heterogeneity we introduce both metropolitan area (MSA)
and year fixed effects, τm and τt , respectively. We also include geographic (g) specific
time trends, i.e. τg ×τt . In our preferred specification we impose Census District time




= τm +τt +βV C ccm,t +τg ×τt +εm,t (1)
The OLS estimation of the coefficient of the effect of violent crime on suburban-
ization, β can suffer different biases. Firstly, reverse causality might be present since
more suburbanized cities might have poorer city centers, which in turn can increase
crime rates in the city center. Evidence of this reverse causality has been found by
Jargowsky and Park (2009). Moreover, omitted variable biases can contribute to the
inconsistency of our estimation. One possible omitted variable is the proportion of
black people living in the city center. Boustan (2010) shows that part of the white
flight has followed the influx of black population in the city. This estimation can also
suffer omitted variable bias if cities with more highways tend to have higher level of
crimes.
We propose a new instrument that, we argue, can exogenously predict crime at
city center level: the interaction between the lagged amount of the tetraethyl lead (TL)
used in car gasoline in the U.S. and a proxy for the bioavalability of lead to humans
in the ciy centers. Lead has an effect of brain development of children, and increase
their aggresive behaviour. The highest potential of delinquency is reached at 19 years
old.6 Hence, for any given year, we use tonnes of tetraethyl lead in cars 19 years before
to predict crime rates. Section 4.1 discusses in details the relationship between lead
and crime.
Lead adsorption in the soil depends on particular soil characteristics. Bioavail-
ability of lead is proxied by a specific function of the average pH of the soil in the
city center. In particular, our soil bioavailability indicator is a dummy variable taking
value 1 if the average pH of the soil is between the values of 6.8 and 7.7. We obtain this
proxy using a machine learning algorithm described in Section 4.2. The first stage of
our instrumental variable estimation is reported in Equation 2. One of the main ad-
vantages of our instrument is that it varies both in space and time, therefore we can
include year and city fixed effects in our first stage.
V C ccm,t =µm +µt +χT Lt−19 × 1
(
6.8 ≤ pH ccm ≤ 7.7
)+µg ×µt +εm,t (2)
6According to United States Department of Justice (1993) in 1965 people with 19 years old had the
highest arrest rates for violent crimes.
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3 Data
We have assembled an unique database for 306 city centers from 1960 to 2014 in the
U.S. combining different data sources. The first data source we use is the F.B.I. Uni-
form Crime Reporting (UCR) Program Data (United States Department of Justice).
For each local enforcement agency, which is coded by a Originating Agency Iden-
tifier (ORI) number, this data source provides information about monthly number
of crimes for each year for all different kind of crimes.7 This database also reports
the total jurisdictional population under responsibility of that particular ORI. We use
this information to compute our suburbanization measure.8 We use the F.B.I. defi-
nition of violent crime, that is the sum of murder and non-negligent manslaughter,
total robberies, forcible rape, and aggravated assaults.9 We use the Law Enforcement
Agency Identifiers Crosswalk database to link ORIs to Census Geographic Definitions
(National Archive of Criminal Justice Data, 2006). We keep geography fixed at 2000
definition and we aggregate all the information at U.S. Place level.10
We merge our database with the data provided by Baum-Snow (2007). This database
contains information of several social and economic characteristics of Metropolitan
Statistical Area (MSA) and city centers.11 Moreover, we use the definition of city cen-
ters provided by Baum-Snow (2007), that is for each MSA he defines the city center as
the U.S. Place with the largest population in 1950.12 Therefore, for every city center we
can compute its jurisdictional population, the population of the rest of places inside
the same MSA (that we call suburbs) and the population of the MSA. The suburban-
ization measure we use is the population in the city center divided by the population
in the MSA. Similarly, we construct violent crime rate per capita at city center, suburb,
and MSA level.
For the construction of our instrument we use two different databases. First, we
use the United States Geological Survey (U.S.G.S.) General Soil Map in order to obtain
7We aggregate monthly data to years data. If crimes were not reported for more than 9 months we
reweight the number of crimes by 12 divided the number of months in which data are missing.
8F.B.I. population in Census years is very similar to the population obtained by the U.S. Census. For
non-Census years F.B.I. produces its own population estimation. We do not believe that the possible
measurement error in population relates in any way with our instrument. Moreover, we also present
robustness using only Census population data. There are some missing values in the population data,
we substitute this value by the mean value of population in the ORI. This procedure does not alter in
any way our results and interpretation.
9FBI defines these crime as follows. Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter:: willful killing of one
human being by another. Robbery: taking or attempting to take anything of value from the care, cus-
tody, or control of a person or persons by force or threat of force or violence and/or by putting the vic-
tim in fear. Rape: penetration, of the vagina or anus with any body part or object, or oral penetration
by a sex organ of another person, without the consent of the victim. Attempts or assaults to commit
rape included. Aggravated assaults: unlawful attack by one person upon another for the purpose of
inflicting severe or aggravated bodily injury. Simple assaults excluded.
10U.S. places are settled concentrations of population that are identifiable by name. They can be
legally incorporated under the laws of the state in which they are located (Incorporated Places) or not
(Census Designated Places, CDC). CDC boundaries are defined by the U.S. Census in cooperation with
local or tribal officials, and they usually coincide with visible features. They are generally updated prior
to each decennial census.
11Baum-Snow (2007) also keeps MSA geography constant over time using definitions from 2000.
12We keep only information of ORIs inside one MSA. We drop all the ORIs belonging to multiple
counties at the same time. We only keep observations of municipal jurisdiction crime.
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information about the soil pH (United States Department of Agriculture). We use as
pH measure the negative logarithm to the base 10 of the hydrogen ion activity in the
soil using the 1:1 soil-water ratio method representative value. For every U.S. Census
Place we compute the average pH level and information about earth slope, elevation
and precipitation.13 Second, national consumption of tetraethyl lead as gasoline ad-
ditive comes from the Bureau of Mines Mineral Yearbooks (United States Bureau of
Mines).
Data on firms decentralization comes from United States Census County Business
Pattern (CBP) 1974-2013. This database reports the number of employed workforce
and payroll for every industry and county. Data until 1998 reports information up to
4 digits SIC industries, and data from 1999 onwards up to 6 digits NAICS industries.
We only keep 2 digits industries.14 We identify in which county the city center of one
MSA belongs and we compute the proportion of employment in every industry in the
county over the total employment in the same MSA. If one MSA is composed only
by one county we assign a missing value to the proportion of employment in every
industry in the county over the total employment in the same MSA.
Our final database encompasses more than 9,750 observations from 1960 to 1991,
and 7,038 observations from 1992 to 2014. All our main discussion will focus on the
period from 1960 to 1991. This is given by the fact that lead poisoning increased until
1972, and the biggest effect on crime of lead poisoning in one year appears 19 years
later, when affected children have the maximum probability to commit a crime. We
devote Online Appendix E to discus what happens after 1991. In this period lead poi-
soning decreased in U.S. and as a result also crime rates decreased, but at the same
time U.S. cities continue to maintain suburbanized (see Figure 1(a)). Summary statis-
tics of our database from 1960 to 1991 are reported in Online Appendix A.
4 Instrumental variable
4.1 Background on lead poisoning
Lead is a heavy metal with several properties. It has high density, lasts longer and is
more malleable than iron, is resistant to corrosion, and has relative abundance. Be-
cause of these characteristics lead was adopted historically for several uses: plumb-
ing, solder, painting, bullets, and as a gasoline additive. According to Dapul and
Laraque (2014) there are several ways through which children and adults can get ex-
posed to lead. Ingestion sources are lead-based paint, contaminated water by lead
13U.S.G.S. divides the U.S. in different map areas. Every map area is composed by different soils
(components), and every component is composed by multiple layers (horizons). We use information
only at soil level, that is when the distance from the top of the soil to the upper boundary of the soil
horizon is 0. For every map unit we compute the weighted mean of pH of the components, weighting
by the component percentage in the map unit. Finally, for every place we compute the weighted mean
of pH of the map area, weighted by their area.
14We also aggregate data at bigger industries definitions: agriculture, good producing industries, ser-
vice producing industries and other industries. We aggregate the industries as follows. Good producing
industries: Mining, Construction and Manufacturing. Service producing industries: Transportation,
Communications, Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services, Wholesale Trade, Retail Trade, Finance, Insur-
ance, And Real Estate, Services
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pipes, lead settled in soil because of leaded gasoline, paint or other industrial sources,
food cultivated in contaminated soils, or leaded objects (such as children’s toys). The
two main inhalation sources of lead has been leaded gasoline and occupational haz-
ards in the construction, soldering, painting, plumbing, automotive and ammunition
sectors.
Lead has been used since antiquity. Its use as pigment was documented in An-
cient Greece and Roman pipes were largely built with lead. The use of lead for pipes,
paint and as gasoline additive has followed different timing. Lead pipes were installed
on a major scale in the U.S. since the late 1800s. The danger of lead pipes was increas-
ingly documented in the late 1800s and early 1900s and by the 1920s many cities and
towns were prohibiting or restricting their use (Rabin, 2008). Conversely, the use of
lead in paint peaked in 1920s, and then its use declined significantly (Mielke, 1999).
The Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act, which restricted the lead content in
paint, was signed in 1971, and finally lead was banned from paint in 1978.
Tetraethyl lead was mixed with gasoline from the 1920s, because it can improve
engine compression by raising the octane level of gasoline. The consumption of leaded
gasoline skyrocketed in post World War II because of the increase in the use of lead
as antiknock gasoline additive and the increase in the number of cars. In 1965, it was
discovered that lead had a pollution effect on the environment (Patterson, 1965), and
several works followed in order to prove the link between gasoline and lead pollu-
tion. Patterson’s work also began an intense debate between environmentalists and
the strong industrial lead lobby. The phase-down of leaded gasoline in U.S. began in
1975 when the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) required major gasoline re-
tailers to sell at least one grade of unleaded gasoline that was required to protect new
car models with catalytic converters (Nriagu, 1990). The lead phase-down contin-
ued during the 1980s when the EPA set new limits for the amount of lead in gasoline.
Leaded gasoline was finally banned in 1996.
A large medical and biological literature has given evidence of the health effect
of lead, in particular on neurobehavioural development in children (see Roper et al.,
1991 and International Programme on Chemical Safety, 1995). Lead is a potent neu-
rotoxin which alters the formation of the brain and as a result influences the forma-
tion of cognitive and non-cognitive skills (see Toscano and Guilarte, 2005 and Cecil
et al., 2008). According to Roper et al., 1991, "Children are at higher risk for lead expo-
sure because they have more hand-to-mouth activity and they absorb more lead than
adults". It has been shown that even low level exposure to lead during childhood is
related to cognitive and behavioral outcomes, such as lower IQ, ADHD, and hyperac-
tivity (see Banks et al., 1996, Canfield et al., 2003, Chandramouli et al., 2009, and Nigg
et al., 2010). Moreover, early age lead poisoning has been found to relate to antiso-
cial behaviours, such as aggressivity, violence and impulsivity, increasing the risk of
delinquency (see Denno, 1990, Needleman et al., 1996, and Needleman et al., 2002).
Likewise, prenatal and childhood blood lead concentrations are associated with more
criminal offenses (see Stretesky and Lynch, 2001 and Wright et al., 2008). All these re-
ported effect are given by the fact that lead damages neurotransmitter function in the
brain that regulate impulse control (Aizer and Currie, 2017).
The effects of lead have been object of study in several recent works in economics.
Exploiting differences in road proximity and the de-leading of gasoline, Aizer and
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Currie (2017) find a causal positive effect of lead on juvenile delinquency. The pos-
itive relationship between lead and criminal behaviour has been also found by Reyes
(2015a), who also exploits variation coming from the phase-down of leaded gasoline.
Feigenbaum and Muller (2016) show that water pipe lead exposure increased homi-
cide rates in the 1920s and 1930s, instrumenting lead exposure by city distance from
lead refineries. A second strand of works found a negative causal effect of early child-
hood lead exposure on academic achievement (Aizer et al., 2016, Reyes, 2015b, Grön-
qvist et al., 2016, and Ferrie et al., 2012). Similarly, Billings and Schnepel (2017) esti-
mate how lead-remediation policies can reverse the negative outcomes of lead poi-
soning. A last group of research identifies the positive effect of lead exposure on mor-
tality in the 1920s exploiting variation from water pipe lead poisoning coming from
different water acidity, measured by the water pH (Troesken, 2008, and Clay et al.,
2014).
In this paper we are interested in obtaining exogenous variation of crime rates in
the U.S. in the years between the 1960s and the 1990s, a period in which the U.S. ex-
perienced a dramatic increase in violent crime. We exploit the massive increase of
national consumption of leaded gasoline and its effect 19 years later on violent crime,
when poisoned children had the highest potential for delinquency. The time rela-
tionship between national levels of violent crime and lagged tetraethyl lead is evident
from Figure 2. In fact, the increase in tetraethyl lead matches with the posterior in-
crease in violent crimes, the two time series reaching their peaks in 1972 and 1991, re-
spectively. We exploit official national levels of lead poisoning by gasoline published
by United States Bureau of Mines (United States Bureau of Mines) rather than local
levels. The reason for this choice is that local lead exposure can be correlated with
potential confounders of suburbanization, such as the proportion of highways and
cars in a city.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
We obtain geographical variation of the effect of lead on crime by exploiting the
fact that lead is absorbed differently by different types of soil. Lead released from
combustion of leaded gasoline becomes airborne and accumulates in the top 1 to
2 inches of soil. Evidence suggests that the bioavailability of lead in soil reaches its
lowest level with a near-neutral soil pH, i.e. when the pH of the soil is around 6.5 or
7 (Reddy et al., 1995, Stehouwer and Macneal, 1999 and Peryea, 2001).15 Despite the
existing evidence on the fact that the bioavailability of lead decreases between acidic
and near-neutral soils, where it reaches its minimum value, we are not aware of any
study about bioavailability in very alkaline soils (pH higher than 7.5).
Children can ingest residual lead in the soil by eating the soil or inhalating it be-
cause of air dust resuspension (Laidlaw and Filippelli, 2008, Zahran et al., 2013, and
15The bioavailability of lead in soil depends on its solubility, i.e. how tightly it is held by soil parti-
cles (Stehouwer and Macneal, 1999). Lead is more soluble in acidic soils (pH lower than 6.5), and it is
less soluble in neutral soils (pH between 6.5 and 7.5). Lead availability is considered to be minimized
when the pH of the soil is higher than 6.5 or 7. This is given by the fact that the existence of solid-
phase phosphates in the soil can induces the dissolution of lead mineral and its desorption. That is,
the desorption of lead causes the formation of pyromorphites and the bioavailability of lead is reduced
without its removal from the soil (Traina and Laperche, 1999). Reddy et al. (1995) conclude that mo-
bility of lead will increase in environments having low pH due to the enhanced solubility of lead under
acidic conditions.
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Aizer and Currie, 2017). In fact, due to resuspension of roadside soil lead can be trans-
ported longer distances inside the city and then house dust can be contaminated by
the soil attached to shoes (Filippelli et al., 2005, Hunt et al., 2006, Laidlaw and Fil-
ippelli, 2008). As a result it is not needed to live right close to a soil surface to get
poisoned.16 Several studies have assessed that the lead entering homes is a combi-
nation of lead from cars with smaller amounts of lead from paints (Clark et al., 2006,
and Laidlaw and Filippelli, 2008). According to these studies this is given by the fact
that lead paint particles tend to be larger than the one formed by leaded gasoline and
then they do not penetrate cracks in homes.
4.2 Construction of the soil quality proxy
We multiply national lagged levels of tetraethyl lead consumption with a proxy for av-
erage soil quality at the city center level to obtain exogenous variation in crime rates.
We use a function of the average soil pH in the city center as proxy for lead availabil-
ity. This is in the same spirit to the use of water pH as instrument for water lead pipe
poisoning done by Ferrie et al. (2012), Troesken (2008), and Clay et al. (2014). From
the previously reported evidence we know that the proxy for soil quality we need to
exploit has to be closer to near-neutral soil pH. For every city center, we combine data
for the average pH level from the United States Geological Survey with crime obser-
vations from F.B.I. With our data, we can test that the effect of lead on violent crime is
weaker at levels of pH close to 7.
We test this hypothesis estimating the marginal effect of lead on violent crime
rates. We regress violent crime on the interaction of lead with polynomial of pH, up
to the third order, and we plot the marginal effects computed at the mean. Figure 3
reports these results. As it is possible to observe, the effect of lead on violent crime is
always positive and decreasing up to a pH of 7.5. Point estimate of the marginal effect
then increases in the area of alkaline soils (pH higher than 7.5), but these variations
do not appear to be significant.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
A priori we are not sure of which interval of pH is the best in expressing lead tox-
icity. We apply machine learning tools to choose the most adequate instrument be-
tween the set of all potential candidates, that are dummy variables taking 1 for an
interval between any possible minimum and maximum level of pH. For every possi-
ble pH interval we run the first stage regression of violent crime rate per capita over
city and year fixed effects and the interaction between tetraethyl lead and the pH in-
terval considered. We select the pH interval that maximizes the F-statistics for the
relevance of our instrument.
This is similar to the regression tree method for prediction (see Breiman et al.,
1984 for classic reference and Athey and Imbens, 2017 for a review). Regression trees
are methods in which the covariate space is sequentially partitioned into subspaces
16We exploit variation coming from natural soil only. Despite important part of cities are paved, in
the city centers there is still enough variation in natural soil. Large surfaces of cities are covered by
parks and playgrounds. According to Harnik et al. (2015) in 2014 for high density cities in U.S. almost
12 % of their city area is parkland, and New York and San Francisco has around 20 % of their area as
parks. This proportion is likely to be considerably bigger at the time of the lead poisoning happen in
the 1960s.
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such that the sum of squared residuals (SSR) is minimized. That is, given a variable
X, regression tree methods find the value of the split c which divide the sample by
X < c versus X ≥ c and minimized the SSR. This process can be expanded to multiple
covariates and splits. In our context we look for two splits of the variable pH. More-
over, instead of minimizing the SSR directly, we maximize the F-statistics. That is, we
maximize the SSR difference between a model in which we predict violent crime us-
ing only city and year fixed effects (the included instrument) and a model in which
we predict violent crime using the included and excluded (the interaction between
national lagged tetraethyl lead and a proxy for soil quality) instruments.
The instrument we select is the interaction between national lagged values of
tetraethyl lead and a dummy taking values 1 if the pH of the soil in the city center is
between 6.8 and 7.7. From now on we refer to MSA in which the average pH of the city
centers is between 6.8 and 7.7 as places with good soil. All the other cities are referred
as places with bad soil. Using the pH interval 6.8 to 7.7 provides a F-statistics of the
excluded instrument of 262.16. The estimated coefficient of the interaction between
tetraethyl lead and this soil quality proxy is -0.00528 with a standard error of 0.000326.
The tetraethyl lead proxy used has been divided by its maximum level. Therefore, the
effect of increasing tetraethyl lead from 0 to its maximum historical value in U.S. is in-
creasing violent crime by 52 violent crimes less per 10,000 inhabitants in places with
good soils. That is, the differential effect of lead in places with good and bad soils
account for one third of the overall maximum value of violent crimes in 1990.
We summarize the results of our instrument selection procedure in Figures 4.
Panel 4(a) reports all the estimated coefficients of the interaction between lead and
any possible pH interval, while Panel 4(b) represents the corresponding F-statistics.
As it is predicted from biological theory, the absorption of lead into soil should be
weaker close to soil pH neutrality. Panel 4(a) shows exactly that first stage coefficient
for dummy variables including pH levels lower than 6.5 in the good soil definition
tends to be positive or non significant. As the minimum value of pH is higher than 6.5,
then the interaction between lead and soil quality becomes negative and significant.
Moreover, the first stage coefficients are robust around our preferred pH interval.
Changing the lower or the upper bound of the pH interval does not change the
effect of the interaction between lead and pH. Similarly, the F-statistics of the first
stage dramatically increases when the soil quality proxy includes near to neutrality pH
levels (see Panel 4(b)). Despite the pH interval we choose is the one with the highest F-
statistics, changing the upper or lower pH interval bounds does not alter the relevance
of our instrument. We present robustness of our estimation to the use of other pH
intervals in Online Appendix D.3.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE]
Given our soil quality proxy, Figure 5 shows that the F-statistics of relevance of our
instrument is maximized using the 19th year lag of national levels of lead poisoning,
which is consistent with the evidence reported about the age structure of crimes by
the FBI.
[INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE]
We give additional evidence of the effect of lead on crime in Online Appendix
B.0.1. In Online Appendix B.0.2 we provide evidence that our generated instrument
is not an outlier of the distribution of possible instrument by computing standard
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errors for our soil quality proxy. We perform a placebo exercise by creating random
instrument and report the results in Online Appendix B.0.3.
4.3 Identifying assumption: relevance
The first assumption we need for the validity of our instrument is relevance. We ob-
tain time-variation of crime using the national lagged level of lead used as gasoline
additive 19 years before. Cross-sectional variation of crime comes from variation in
city-averaged soil lead adsorption. Figure 6 reports the different time series of crime
between places with good and bad soil. In the 1960s, when tetraethyl lead was begin-
ning its increase, the level of crime rates between good and bad soils was very similar.
As treatment took place, crime increased more in places with bad soil in terms of lead
adsorption. In fact, peak in crime rates in places with good soil is 66 % of the peak in
places with bad soil.
[INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE]
The U.S. map in Figure 7 gives a schematic representation of the exogenous vari-
ation we exploit. All of the East Coast has bad soil in terms of lead adsorption. In the
rest of the US the pH seems to be more uniformly located across cities. We will ex-
ploit only variation inside census regions and districts by controlling for geographical
specific time trends, so that results cannot be driven by a East versus rest-of-the-US
comparison.17
[INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE]
Tables 1 and 2 show the relevance of our instrument reporting the coefficient of
the first stage regression and the corresponding F-statistics controlling for time trends
at different geographical levels. Since some of the variables in our database are mea-
sured yearly and some only in Census years, we report the first stage estimates using
all the years in our sample in Table 1 and estimates using only Census years in Table
2. Our first stage coefficient is always significant. Using all the years in the sample our
F-statistics range between 262 and 47, in the cases of using only city and year fixed
effects or also imposing state specific time trends. Using only census years we obtain
sufficient F-statistics imposing year and MSA fixed effects and Census region specific
trends. Therefore, we augment the model in Equation 1 using Census division spe-
cific trends in the case of using variables measured annually. When we use variables
measured only in Census years we control for Census region specific trends.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
17Census Divisions are defined by the U.S. Census as: New England: Connecticut, Maine, Mas-
sachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont; Middle Atlantic: New Jersey, New York, Penn-
sylvania; East North Central: Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin; West North Central: Iowa,
Nebraska, Kansas, North Dakota, Minnesota, South Dakota, Missouri; South Atlantic: Delaware, Dis-
trict of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Vir-
ginia; East South Central: Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee; West South Central: Arkansas,
Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas; Mountain: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, Montana, Utah,
Nevada, Wyoming; Pacific: California, Oregon, Washington.
Moreover, Census regions are defined by the U.S. Census as: West: Pacific and Mountain; Midwest:
West North Central and East North Central; Northeast: New England and Middle Atlantic; South: West
South Central, East South Central, and South Atlantic
13
4.4 Identifying assumption: exogeneity
Our identification assumption is that in years in which national consumption of tetraethyl
lead increased places with good and bad soils would have had similar trends in terms
of suburbanization other than through differences in violent crime. This assumption
is credible if soil pH is as good as randomly assigned. We present two balancing tests
to support our claim. First, we demonstrate that places with good and bad soils have
parallel trends in both suburbanization and violent crimes prior to the massive in-
crease in tetraethyl lead. Second, we show that places with good and bad soil have
similar pre-trends also in terms of other observable characteristics.
Table 3 reports the balancing test for the suburbanization and crime variables. We
report both the difference in levels and trends between places with good and bad soils.
Moreover, we do this exercise both without controlling for any geographical aggrega-
tion fixed effect ("All U.S." columns) and also controlling for Census Division fixed
effects ("Inside Division" columns). The pre-trend assumption seems to be guaran-
teed. As soon as we control for Census Division trends, places with good and bad soil
had similar trends between the 1950 and the 1960, that is before the great increase in
national use of lead as gasoline additive. To further reassure of the exogeneity of our
soil quality proxy we also show level differences. Places with good and bad soil tend
to be similar in terms of their pre-treatment level of suburbanization, population and
crime as soon as we control for Census Division dummies.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
Balancing test for other observables are also reported in Tables 3. From Table 3
we can rule out that places with good and bad soils had different trends in other
geographic and social characteristics that can influence suburbanization. It seems
however that places with good and bad soils have some differences in pre-treatment
levels in terms of rent, income, precipitation rates, business and manufacturing em-
ployment, public transportation and education. We show in Online Appendix D.2 that
our results are robust to the inclusion of these variables as controls. It is interesting to
note that places with good and bad soil are similar in terms of agriculture and mining
employment. Therefore, we can rule out the possibility that soil pH is affecting subur-
banization by changing the relative proportion of land used for urban and agricultural
use inside a city.
Table 3 shows that places with good and bad soils are very similar in terms of pre-
treatment levels and trends of highway construction. Hence, our results cannot be
driven by highway construction, a channel emphasized in previous literature. We
show in Online Appendix D.1 that the results we found are robust even controlling
for highways, and dealing for its particular endogeneity.
In order to understand what would have happened to violent crime if the lead
poisoning shock did not take place, we estimate the time-varying effects of soil pH on
crime. We run regressions of the effect of soil pH interacted with year dummies on
violent crime, that is Equation 3.
V C ccm,t =µm +µt +χt 1(year = t )∗ g ood soi l ccm +µg ×µt +εm,t (3)
Results of this regression are reported in Figure 8. In line with the results reported
in the previous Section, between 1960 and 1991 violent crime increased less in city
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centers with good soil. As the de-leading phase started this difference shrank. In 1996
lead was completely banned, this means that by 2014 almost all adults have suffered
very little lead poisoning and people younger than 18 years old were not poisoned at
all. As we observe in Figure 8 there is no statistical difference between good and bad
soil city centers today.
[INSERT FIGURE 8 HERE]
This is further evidence of the exogeneity assumption. In particular, cities with
good and bad soil started with the same level of violent crime when there was no lead
poisoning. They then ended with no differences in violent crime, when lead poison-
ing was no longer relevant. Therefore, this evidence supports our claim that violent
crime would have always be the same in these two kinds of cities if lead poisoning
would not have been there.
Figure 8 also provides evidence in favour of the exclusion restriction. If the effect
of pH on crime is only passing through its interaction with lead then the results of
the estimated regressions of the effect of soil quality by year should be similar to the
lagged time series of lead poisoning. The time series of the reduced form coefficients
of our soil quality index mimics the lagged time series of lead, strongly supporting




In this Section we first provide estimates of our main equation of interest, Equation 1,
that looks at the effect of violent crime in city centers on suburbanization. As shown
in column (1) of Table 4 there is a negative correlation between violent crime and the
share of population that lives in the city center. As discussed previously this estimate
cannot be interpreted as causal, and because of this we implement our instrumental
variable methodology. That is, we predict violent crime using the interaction between
lagged national lead levels and a proxy for soil quality. Column (2) shows that places
with good soil experienced a slower increase in violent crime and this difference is
substantial. In 1991, at the peak of lead exposure for potential criminals, a MSA with
bad soil had 0.91 standard deviations more violent crimes with respect to one with
good soil.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
In Column (3) we estimate the causal effect of crime on the share of people that
lives in the city center using our instrumental variable strategy. Estimates show that
an increase in one standard deviation in violent crime decreases the share of popu-
lation living in the city center by 7.2 percentage points. The upward bias of the OLS
estimate is consistent with the presence of reverse causality bias from suburbaniza-
tion to violent crimes. Online Appendix C discusses for which values of the estimated
coefficients the OLS bias could have been induced by reverse causality.
Column (4) reports the reduced form effect of our instrument on the percentage of
people living in the city center. The effect of increasing lead from no poisoning to the
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maximum level increased suburbanization in places with bad soil by 6.8 percentage
points with respect to places with good soil.18
In Column (5) we estimate our preferred specification in which we additionally
control for census division times year fixed effects. In this regression we are only ex-
ploiting differences between good and bad soil city centers that are inside the same
census division. Our estimates are now robust to any potential omitted variable com-
mon to MSAs in a certain census division. As shown in Column (5), previous results
are robust to this specification. According to these estimates an increase in one stan-
dard deviation in violent crime decreases the share of population living in the city
center by 8.4 percentage points. This implies that if in 1991 the level of crime would
have been as low as in 1960 the percentage of people that lived in the city centers
would have been 15 percentage points higher19.
Column (6) shows the same results using as dependent variable the population in
city centers. A one standard deviation increase in violent crime decreases the popu-
lation of the city center by 26%. The overall increase in crime rates from their level in
1960 to that one in 1991 translates into a 46% decline in city center population.
We show that our results are robust to several specifications. In Section 6.1 we
show that despite the fact that lead could potentially affect educational outcomes,
this channel does not bias our results. Online Appendix D discusses the additional
robustness we conduct. We discuss that our results are robusts to the inclusion of
possible confounders, such as highways (Online Appendix D.1) and many other pos-
sible variables (Online Appendix D.2). In Online Appendix D.3 we demonstrate that
our results do not depend on the particular decision of the instrument. We also show
that the effect of violent crime on suburbanization does not depend on the particular
geographical variation we exploit (Online Appendix D.4). Finally, in Online Appendix
D.5 we demonstrate the robustness of the standard errors estimated.
We report estimates for the effect of crime on suburbanization in the de-leading
phase, after 1991, in Online Appendix E. We show that when lead poisoning de-
creased, violent crime rates decreased faster in places with bad soil than in places
with good soil. However, in the same period places with bad soil did not decrease sub-
urbanization, providing possible evidence for the persistence of the effect of crime on
suburbanization. Online Appendix F discusses how our first and second stage results
can potentially vary through time. We show that the effect of resuspended lead on
violent crime is constant through decades. Nevertheless, the effect of violent crime
rates on suburbanization is declining through time.
The effect of violent crime on suburbanization also presents important hetero-
geneity with respect to several city characteristics. We present the analysis of the
mechanism and channels behind the crime effect on suburbanization in Online Ap-
pendix G. We show that this effect is stronger in cities in which the suburbs have lower
levels of black population with respect to the city center. Moreover, suburbanization
was stronger in cities with higher levels of previous suburbanization, that were richer,
with smaller geographical constraints, and where more highways were built.
18This is given by the fact that the national level of lead poisoning has been normalized by its maxi-
mum value.
19Violent crime per capita in city centers increased by 1.79 standard deviations between 1960 and
1991.
16
5.2 Magnitude of the effect of violent crime on suburbanization
To get a better idea of the size of the effects estimated in Table 4 we construct two
counterfactual scenarios: one in which crime remained throughout our sample at
the low level of 1960 and one in which crime in city centers increases at the same rate
as in the suburbs. The time series of the share of people living in the city center in the
U.S. and in these counterfactuals are displayed in Figure 9.
[INSERT FIGURE 9 HERE]
As previously described there was a clear pattern of suburbanization in the period
studied. The percentage of people living in the city center moved from 44% in 1960
to 33% in 1990. Our estimates instead predict that if the US had maintained the low
levels of violent crime in city centers observed in 1960, we would have seen a process
of urbanization of US cities. The percentage of people living in city centers would
have increased, reaching 50% in 1991.
Some caveats are necessary to have in mind when interpreting this result. First of
all, we do not want to claim here that if the U.S. would have banned the use of lead in
gasoline since the beginning we would not have observed any growth in violent crime
since the 60s. Many factors would have influenced the violent crime rate in this period
and only one of them is lead exposure. Furthermore, it is important to notice that with
this counterfactual experiment we are also not exploring what would have been the
suburbanization trends if all the MSAs in the U.S. would have been in our control
group, namely good soil. In fact, also the MSA we used as control in our estimations
have suffered an increase in crime in this period. Moreover, we are not considering
that the proportion of people living in city centers could have mechanically decreased
because of the limitation in space in the centers to allocate the demographic increase
in population in any U.S. city.
It is likely that crime rates would have still increased in U.S. if lead poisoning had
not happened. One possibility might have been that crime rates in city centers would
have followed the trends that the suburbs experienced.20 Therefore, we compute a
second counterfactual experiment in which crime rates in the city center would have
increased at the same rate as in the suburbs. In this case our estimates predict that if
the U.S. city centers increased crime as in the suburbs then the proportion of people
living in the city center would have increased only marginally. As it shown in Figure
9, the percentage of people in city centers would have increased from 44 % in 1960
reaching 45% in 1991.
Cullen and Levitt (1999) estimate that an increase in 10% in crimes rates in the
city center translates into a decline in city center population by 1%. Our estimated
effect has a bigger magnitude. We estimate that an increase in 10% in crimes rates
in the city center translates into a decline in city center population by 2.6%.21 The
difference in magnitude can be explained by the fact that Cullen and Levitt (1999) use
as instrument the punitiveness of the state criminal justice system. For instance, this
20We show in the Online Appendix B.1.2 that the lead poisoning shock we are exploiting did not affect
in any form the suburbs.
21Violent crime per capita in the city center has mean and standard deviation of 0.00577 and 0.00581,
respectively. Therefore, increasing violent crimes by one standard deviation corresponds to increasing
violent crime by 100.6%. We computed the effect of a 10% increase in crimes rates on population
dividing -0.257 by 10.06.
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instrument can influence both crime rates in city centers and suburbs. Subsequently,
the increase in crime rates in the suburbs can lead to an increase in the population of
city centers.22
We can compare our findings with the results found in similar studies of other
causes of suburbanization. The relative increase in crime between city centers and
suburbs from 1960 to 1991 implies a 35% decrease in the population of city centers.23
This point estimate is higher than similar coefficients found in other studies, but it in-
clude them in its confidence interval.24 According to Boustan (2010), black migration
from the South was responsible for a 17% decline in total urban population. Baum-
Snow (2007) reports that the construction of the interstate highway system led to a
decrease of central city population by 23%.25 That is, for a city like Philadelphia, with
2 million people living in the city center in 1960, 4,000 more violent crimes in 30 years
move away the same number of people from the center to the suburbs as if one high-
way passing from city center would have been built.26
The different suburbanization mechanisms proposed by Baum-Snow (2007) and
Boustan (2010) are likely to be complementary with the increase in crime rates. In
Section 5.3 we show that suburbanization caused by violent crime has been dispro-
portionately driven by the white population. The abandonment of city centers by
whites and the consequent increase in the relative proportion of black population in
city centers could have in turn made more white people move to the suburbs, consis-
tent with the story proposed by Boustan (2010). Similarly, we show in Section 7 that
the increase in violent crimes stimulate the construction of highways, which can then
explain part of U.S. suburbanization (Baum-Snow, 2007).
5.3 Displacement Effects
In this section of the paper we explore whether violent crime does not only change the
share of people living in the city center but displaces people from one city to another.
Investigating this effect is important for two main reasons: First of all, if this was the
22Cullen and Levitt (1999) control in one specification for crime rates in the suburbs and they indeed
find a stronger effect of crime rates in city centers on the population in city centers. However, crime
rates in the suburbs can be a bad control in that specification.
23The 35 % refers to the difference in change population if crime would not have increased from the
1960, 46 %, and if crime would have stayed in city centers as in the suburbs, 11 %. This last number has
been found multiplying 0.257 by the standard deviation increase in violent crimes from 1960 to 1991,
1.79, and then dividing it by the relative increase in the number of crime in the city centers from 1960
to 1991 with respect to the same increase in the suburbs, 4. The relative increase in crime between the
centers and suburbs has a similar magnitude by computing using the predicted crime in city centers
and outside from the first stage regression
24The point estimate of the effect of increasing violent crimes in city centers with respect to suburbs
from the levels of 1960 to the level of 1991 on the logarithm of population in the city center is 0.35 with
a standard error of 0.097
25This number has been computed multiplying the effect of building a new highway ray in the city
center, -0.09, by the average number of rays built between 1950 and 1990, 2.6
26This number have been found dividing the effect of building a new highway ray in the city center,
-0.09, by the effect of one violent crime per capita on suburbanization, -0.0843/1.79, normalized by
the population of Philadelphia living in the city center in 1960. Philadelphia city center decline from
2 million people in 1960 to 1.5 in 1991. Moreover, Philadelphia city center has 330 violent crimes per
100’000 in 1960, and 1’400 in 1991.
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case it would add some difficulties to the interpretation of our estimates. If this hap-
pened, it would mean that all cities would be in some way treated by the increase in
lead but for different reasons. The places with bad soil would have been treated be-
cause of the increase of violent crime in the city center, while the places with good
soil would have been treated by an increase of the total population driven by the mi-
grants escaping from the violent cities. Furthermore, it is important to understand
which kind of suburbanization process is caused by an increase in violent crimes. We
could observe a decrease of the percentage of people living in the city center with re-
spect to the suburbs in a context where both of them are losing population due to an
increase in violent crime, and the city center is experiencing this process at a faster
pace. The other option instead is that people are moving inside the MSA away from
the city center.
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
Estimates in Table 5 show that violent crime does not displace people from one
MSA to another but redistributes population from the city center to the suburbs. An
increase in violent crime in the city center is not influencing the overall population
of the MSA (see Column (1)). Increasing violent crimes by 1 standard deviation de-
creases the population living in city centers by 26% and increases the population in
the suburbs by 14% (see Columns (2) and (3)).
Violent crime in the city centers decreased population in the city centers by a sim-
ilar magnitude such as the increase in population in the suburbs. In particular, the
increase in violent crimes from its level of 1960 to its level in 1991 moved an average
of 83,000 people from the city center to the suburbs.27 That means that the increase
in violent crimes in the city center from their level in 1960 to their maximum level in
1991 is responsible for moving almost 25.5 million people outside of city centers in
the all U.S, that is almost 0.8 million people by year.28 For a city of the size of Philadel-
phia each violent crime moved on average 4 people away from city centers per year.29
On the other hand, the increase in violent crimes from its level of 1960 to its level in
1991 increased the population in the suburbs by 62,000 people.30
Columns (4) and (5) show whether the racial demographic composition in the city
changed because of the increase in violent crime. First, Column (4) of Table 5 shows
how as city centers become more violent the percentage of blacks in the MSA does not
change. This is further evidence of the fact that the phenomenon that we are study-
ing is not displacing people from one city to the other but only moving people inside
the same MSA. In Column (5) we can indeed observe that there is differential racial
movements towards the suburbs. A one standard deviation increase in violent crime
27This number has been found multiplying 0.257 by the standard deviation increase in violent crimes
from 1960 to 1991, 1.79, and then by the average population of city centers in 1960, 181,030. The point
estimate is 83,282 and its estimated standard error is 23,294
28This number has been found multiplying 83,282 by the number of urban cities in our sample, 306
29This number have been found dividing the effect of one violent crime per capita on population
in city centers, 83,282, normalized by the population of Philadelphia living in the city center in 1960.
Philadelphia city center decline from 2 million people in 1960 to 1.5 in 1991. Moreover, Philadelphia
city center has 330 violent crimes per 100’000 in 1960, and 1’400 in 1991.
30This number has been found multiplying 0.144 by the standard deviation increase in violent crimes
from 1960 to 1991, 1.79, and then by the average population of suburbs in 1960, 240,516. The point
estimate is 61,976 and its estimated standard error is 23,032
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in the city center increases the share of blacks in the city center by 4.7 percentage
points. This constitutes a substantial increase as in the 1960, before the suburbaniza-
tion process began, 13.4% of the population of the city center was black. This estimate
provides evidence of the “white flight", that is the movement of white affluent people
to the suburbs. What these estimates show is that at least part of this phenomenon
may be explained by the rise of violent crime in the city centers. Moreover, the change
in racial composition in the city centers could in turn explain part of the subsequent
suburbanization, consistent with the mechanism proved by Boustan (2010).
5.4 Effects on employment decentralization
Glaeser and Kahn (2001) show that cities in the U.S. are characterized by decentral-
ization of employment inside the city. In this Section we want to understand whether
violent crime has caused residential suburbanization only or it might also induce de-
centralization of employment location inside the city. In addition we want to under-
stand if the decentralization of firms can be caused by residential suburbanization.
In fact, as a response to the residential suburbanization two processes can happen.
First, firms can move to city centers because of residential suburbanization if the in-
crease in vacant housing in the city center decreases land cost and firms are able to
reconvert residential areas into business areas. This process would increase further
the monocentricity of a city in terms of employment location in the Central Business
District (CBD). Second, firms might follow people in the suburbs in order to reduce
workers’ commuting costs, with the effect of creating new employment centers in the
city outside the CBD. Similarly, residential suburbs can create infrastructure in the
suburbs, such as highways, that firms can exploit.
As we discuss in Section 7 the decision of decentralization of firms will have im-
portant implications for aggregate city variables, such as productivity and amenities
of the city. We collect data for every MSA about the distribution of employment be-
tween the county in which the city center is located and the rest of the city. From Table
6, column (1), we do not evince that overall firms decentralize as a result of higher vi-
olent crimes. However, this result can mask sector heterogeneity in the response to
the increase in violent crimes.
Manufacturing is one of the sectors that relocates the most to suburbs after the
increase in crime rates in city centers. This is likely because manufacturing relies on
the use of large land space which is available in the suburbs. We also find that firms
in wholesale trade, retail trade and other services move to the suburbs. Finance, In-
surance, and Real Estate is the most important sector which does not decentralize as
a result of the crime increase. The reason for which Finance might stay in the cen-
ter can be related to the fact that knowledge spillovers and spatial proximity to other
firms is more important in this sector. In addition, this sector tends to locate more in
skyscrapers present in the CBD. Therefore, as a result of the crime and suburbaniza-
tion shock many firms are relocating in the suburbs but firms in the Finance sector,
which continue to stay in the CBD, leading to the possible creation of multiple em-
ployment centers in the city with different specializations.
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]
We have seen that both people and firms in some sectors move to the suburbs af-
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ter crime increased in the city centers. We can provide evidence of whether people
has followed jobs or the opposite is true. In order to do this we have estimated the
effect of violent crime on suburbanization controlling for past levels of employment
decentralization and the effect of violent crime on employment decentralization con-
trolling for past levels of suburbanization.31 Results are reported in Table 7. As shown
in Columns (1) and (3) violent crimes caused both residential and employment de-
centralization in the manufacturing sector. If violent crimes cause people to move
to the suburbs and then firms follow people, then when we control for the past level
of suburbanization we should not find any effect of violent crime on firm decentral-
ization. This is confirmed in Column (2). In fact, it seems that jobs followed people
which have escaped city centers because of violent crimes. However, the effect of
crimes on suburbanization is maintained even controlling for past level of employ-
ment decentralization in the manufacturing sector (see Column (4)). That is, results
suggest that the first effect of violent crime is to make people leaving city centers and,
then, firms decide to follow people to the suburbs.
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE]
6 Threats to identification and further robustness
The exclusion restriction requires that the effect of the instrument on suburbaniza-
tion is only passing through its effect on crime. In terms of our setting, this means
that the interaction between lagged national lead and soil quality is only affecting
crime and not any other variable that can influence suburbanization. One strength of
our instrument is the use of lagged values of lead poisoning that are a priori only re-
lated to crime rates. We use a lag of 19 years because this is the age in which a person
has the highest probability of getting arrested for a violent crime in 1965 (see United
States Department of Justice, 1993). Unless lead poisoning through soil is affecting an
omitted variable with exactly the same lag of 19 years, our estimates will be consistent.
In order to fully exploit timing idiosyncrasies of crime we conduct a robustness
test in which we do not only use the maximum propensity of committing crime but
all the age structure of crime rate. We discuss in Online Appendix D.3 how we perform
this exercise and we show that all our results are robust to this specification.
Despite people can potentially leave the city center at the time they get poisoned
by lead, for example because of higher pollution, this mechanism would not invali-
date our estimates. This is given by the fact that we exploit the effect that lead has on
crime 19 years later and not in the same year of the poisoning. Moreover, we provide
evidence that people did not leave city centers immediately. This is confirmed by the
fact that places with good and bad soil do not have different pre-trends differences in
suburbanization between the 1950 and 1960, as it is shown in Section 4.4. The lead
poisoning shock began around the 1940s and its effect via pollution should have been
manifested before the 1960s. It was only from the 1970s that public opinion became
31Estimations have been conducted in the sample of years from 1974 to 1991 and without using
Census region time trends in order to guarantee a sufficiently big F-statistics. In order to control for
the possible endogeneity of the 10th lag of suburbanization or firm decentralization we include the
interaction between the 29th lag of national lead poisoning and our soil quality proxy.
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aware of the possible effect of lead poisoning by gasoline additives and the role of soil
quality has not been known until relatively recently (see Reddy et al., 1995).
In Section 6.1 we discard the possibility that lead poisoning can affect suburban-
ization via its effect on cognitive abilities. We present additional evidence in favour of
the exclusion restriction in Online Appendix B. We use the control function approach
to give evidence that the effect of lagged lead 19 years before is likely to pass only via
crime (Online Appendix B.1). We demonstrate that the particular function of pH we
use for our instrument is unlikely to be related to agricultural productivity of one city
(Online Appendix B.1.1). We show that there is no spillover from the city centers to
the suburbs of crime rates and that the only variation in crimes caused by lead hap-
pen in city centers (Online Appendix B.1.2). In fact, it might be possible that crime in
the suburbs increased because people poisoned by lead in the city center either relo-
cate to the suburbs or displace to commit crimes to the suburbs. However, we do not
find evidence supporting this claim. We find non-statistically significant coefficients
of both good soils in the suburbs and in the city center on crime rates in the suburbs.
We provide evidence that lead poisoning is only affecting violent crimes and not other
crimes, as it is predicted by medical literature (Online Appendix B.1.3).
6.1 Potential confounders: cognitive abilities
Recent works have shown that lead poisoning has an effect on child educational at-
tainment (see Aizer et al., 2016, Reyes, 2015b, Grönqvist et al., 2016, and Ferrie et al.,
2012)). Education levels and human capital can bias our results if the effect of edu-
cation on suburbanization follows the same age-structure as crime. If parents decide
to suburbanize because of lower cognitive abilities of student peers of their children,
this would not be a problem for our estimates since this effect should manifest before
the 19-year lag when children are in school age.
Our estimates would be biased if people decide to suburbanize because of their
own lower human capital skills. For example, lead poisoning could make people more
anxious or racist and then decide to leave city centers. If this channel takes effectively
place we should see that people with lower human capital are the one suburbaniz-
ing the most. Table 8 reports evidence against this possibility, by showing the demo-
graphic profile of people suburbanizing between 1975 and 1980.32 People that decide
to suburbanize have on average 31 years, they are more likely to be white, they tend
to have higher high school performances, even between the category of whites, and
they tend to have better occupational outcomes.
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE]
Therefore, it is unlikely that people suburbanize because they get directly lead poi-
soned. Whites are more likely to suburbanize, and there is evidence of racial dispar-
ities in lead poisoning. In fact, Sampson and Winter (2016) demonstrate that black
neighborhoods exhibited extraordinarily high rates of lead toxicity compared to white
neighborhoods. Table 9 shows that the higher propensity of violent crime of the black
population is exacerbated by the presence of highways passing through the city cen-
32The U.S. Census conducted in 1980 allows us to construct the demographic profile of people who
left city centers for suburbs in the last 5 years. We could not construct the same statistics for different
Census years.
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ter in years in which lead poisoning was higher. This is because the black population
tends to live closer to highways and then they are more likely to get poisoned by lead.
Similarly, we show in Online Appendix G that the effect of resuspended lead on crime
is stronger in cities in which the city centers has more highways and a higher propor-
tion of blacks.
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE]
Additionally, our estimates would be biased if people decide to suburbanize be-
cause of lower human capital skills of other people in city center caused by lead poi-
soning. For this channel to be a problem, lead should affect human capital skills with
the same age-structure as the one used to predict crime. In Table 10 we regress a proxy
for human capital skills, the percentage of people with high school diploma, on the in-
teraction between our soil quality index and different lead lags.33 Column (1) shows
that lead can influence human capital but in a different way from which it affects
crime. We only find the 29th lag of lead significant to predict education outcomes. In
contrast, the 19th lag is not significant. One possible explanation for this result is that
lead affects violent crime which then influences the return of education, leading to a
decrease of education 10 years later. However, the result that on aggregate lead can
influence educational outcomes is not consistent with the use of different clustering
in the standard errors, which takes into account the possible geographical correlation
at Census district level in the errors. In fact, from Column (3) we cannot confirm the
effect of the 29th lag of lead poisoning on the share of high school graduates in a MSA.
[INSERT TABLE 10 HERE]
We demonstrate in Table 11 that our estimates of the effect of crime on suburban-
ization are robust to the inclusion of the interaction of soil quality and lead poisoning
29 years before, which can indirectly influence educational outcomes. Column (1)
reports the negative effect of violent crime on suburbanization using Census region
times year fixed effects.34 In column (2) we augment our estimations by also control-
ling for the 29th year lag of lead poisoning. We obtain similar results as when we do
not control for other lags of lead poisoning.
[INSERT TABLE 11 HERE]
If the effect of lead is affecting suburbanization because it decreases human cap-
ital in the city and not because it influences crime we should expect a positive IV
estimate of the effect of a proxy of human capital on the proportion of people living
in city centers. Table 11 column (3) contradicts this hypothesis. While in Column (1)
we observe that the IV estimate of violent crime on the share of population in the city
center is negative, the effect of the share of high school in one MSA is also negative
using resuspended lead as instrument. That is, it is possible that the estimation in
Column (3) is biased because crime and education are correlated and resuspended
lead is affecting crime alone.
To further discard the possibility that suburbanization might happen because of
lower human capital in the city center, we run our estimation of the effect of crime
controlling for instrumented values of educational attainment in the city. We in-
33We use the percentage of people in the MSA with high school diploma from Baum-Snow (2007)
as proxy for educational attainment. Since we have data about percentage of people with high school
diploma for decennial years we use the 9th, 19th and 29th lag of lead poisoning.
34We use these fixed effects because education is measured every Census year.
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strument educational attainment using historic state compulsory education laws col-
lected by Goldin and Katz (2008). In particular, we use two different measures of min-
imum age of compulsory schooling in 1910 as instruments: the school entrance age
and the school leaving age. We obtain a time variant instrument for education by
multiplying minimum age of compulsory schooling by the U.S. proportion of people
with high school in a particular year. Results are reported in Table 12.
[INSERT TABLE 12 HERE]
Columns (1) and (2) replicate our unconditional results. Columns (3) and (6) jointly
estimate the effect of violent crime and education on suburbanization using the two
different education instruments (columns (4)-(5) and (7)-(8) show the correspond-
ing first stage regressions). Both column (3) and (6) show that the effect of crime on
suburbanization is robust to the inclusion of an instrumented education control.
7 Effect of crime on aggregate city variables
We have shown that violent crime has moved people and firms from city centers to the
suburbs. In this Section we explore whether this increase in violent crime and subur-
banization has generated any aggregate effects on the city or if suburbanization is just
a zero sum reshuffling of resources around the city. This is an important question to
tackle in order to gain understanding on how people and firms should be distributed
in a city.
We first explore this question by looking at the effect that violent crime had on
the total population of the city, house prices and median income. Results in Table
13 show that violent crime had no effect on city population while median income
and house prices in the city increased. In fact, from Section 5.3 we already know that
violent crime has only created movement of people inside the city and not between
cities. From Column (2) and (3) we can see that violent crime has a positive effect
on MSA housing affordability both measured as median gross rent per housing unit
(Column (2)) or median single family house value (Column (3)). Moreover, we find
that the increase in violent crimes is associated with higher income also controlling
for the education levels (Columns (4) and (5)).
[INSERT TABLE 13 HERE]
In Table 14 we explore further what are the income effects of violent crime and if
violent crime generated any changes in the means of transportation used in a city. We
observe, first of all, that while income increased overall in the city these gains have not
enjoyed by people living in the city center. In fact, we observe that overall inequalities
increase in the city. In Column (1) we can observe that the Gini index within the city
increased.
[INSERT TABLE 14 HERE]
In Column (2) of Table 14 we can observe that the ratio between income in the city
center and the MSA decreased. In the city center the median income has decreased
but not in a statistical significant way (Column (3)). On the other hand, the overall
income in the MSA has increased indicating that suburbs have become particularly
richer. This results are interesting because they uncover two dynamics that happen
as a city becomes more violent and therefore suburbanized. The first is a selection
process, where richer individuals move to the suburbs leaving the poorest in the city
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center. This is also in line with the results shown in Tables 5 and 8 on how the racial
distribution of people inside a city changes after an increase in violent crime.
The second can be understood in combination with the fact that the cities that are
becoming more violent and more suburbanized are not losing population. A way to
make this possible is that incomes in the MSA increase to compensate for the increase
in violent crime, the increase in transportation cost, and other negative amenities
that the suburbanization process may generate. These two effects combined create
the observed changes in income after an increase in violent crime. In the city center,
the two effects might go in opposite directions. Because of selection only the poor-
est people stay but they have to be compensated with an increase in income so that
they do not migrate to another city. The overall effect is that their income remains
unchanged. Instead in the suburbs the two effects might reinforce each other. The
increase in violent crime moves the richest people to the suburbs and added to this
they also need to be compensated for all the negative amenities.
It is important to notice that these results do not fit with a model in which violent
crime is only decreasing the amenities of a city. In that case, one would expect violent
crime to decrease the population and/or to decrease house prices. Another mecha-
nism that can explain these results is that the increase in violent crime has generated
some positive externality on productivity. In fact, we know from Table 6 that violent
crime increased employment decentralization, and city with multiple employment
centers can be more productive.
Finally, we explore if violent crime generated also changes in the way that individ-
uals move around the city. From Column (4) of Table 14 we can see that violent crime
boosts the construction of highways possibly to facilitate suburbanization of people.
The construction of new infrastructure can potentially have effects on productivity of
the city. Moreover, since we know from Baum-Snow (2007) that highways have a pos-
itive effect on suburbanization, the effect of violent crime on suburbanization that
we have found in Section 5.1 has to be interpreted as the general equilibrium effect
of violent crime on suburbanization which do not partial out for the mediating factor
of the highway construction. In column (5) we further observe that violent crime de-
creases the use of public transportation. These two last results confirm the fact that
violent crime generated suburbanization and this ultimately decreased the demand
for the use of public transportation and increased the demand for highways and the
use of car.
From the results of this Section we can speculate that amenities and productivity
in the city might have been affected by the increase in violent crimes. In the next
Section we build a spatial equilibrium model in which every city is considered as a
different economy in order to make sense of these between-cities comparisons and
assess whether violent crime has influenced amenities and productivity.
7.1 Spatial equilibrium model
We rationalize the city-wide effects of violent crime using the Rosen-Roback spatial
equilibrium model developed by Glaeser (2008) and Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009). The
model has its base in the works of Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982), and the corner-
stone of the model is the concept of spatial equilibrium: utility should be equalized
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between people living in different spaces. The same model has been applied to study
the aggregate effect of city shape by Harari (2015). Each city (m) differs for its specific
level of amenities (θm) and productivity (Am). We assume that violent crime has an
effect on these parameters. Our goal is to estimate how large and in which direction
the effect of violent crime on these parameters has to be to match the city-wide esti-
mates. The model consists of three agents: workers, firms in production sector and
firms in construction sector.
Workers (i) have to decide in which city m to live. We assume perfect mobility
between cities. Moreover, they have to decide how much to consume of a consump-
tion good (C) and housing (H). The price of the consumption good is normalized to
1, while the price of housing is specified as p Hm . They supply inelastically labour and
obtain a city-specific wage (wm). We assume a Cobb-Douglas utility function, where
α represents the share of housing into utility. If a city has a higher level of amenities









s.t. Ci = wm −p Hm Hi
The solution of the worker’s problem gives rise to the so-called spatial equilib-
rium condition. Let’s define v̄m as the indirect utility that should be equalized be-
tween cities. Plugging the optimal solution for the amount of housing, Hi = αwmp Hm , and
consumption good, Ci = (1−α) wm , into the utility and taking logs we can write the
spatial equilibrium condition as in Equation 4. Lower amenities in one city should
be compensated by higher wages or lower house prices to obtain the same utility be-
tween cities.





The representative firm in production sector decides the amount of labour (N)
and traded capital (K ) to hire to produce the consumption good. Labour is paid the
wage level (wm). Traded capital can be purchased at a price of 1 in any location. Every
city is characterized by a specific level of productivity (Am) and a fixed-supply of non-
traded capital (Z̄m). As reported in Glaeser (2008), the assumption of the existence
of traded and non-traded capital allows to have firms facing constant returns to scale
but to have decreasing returns to scale at city level, and then the presence of a finite
number of firms in each city. We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function where
β and γ represent the share of labour and traded capital into the production function.




βK γZ̄ 1−β−γm −wm N −K
The solution of this problem gives rise to the labour demand condition reported
in logarithm terms in Equation 5.















)− log (N̄)] (5)
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The last actor of our model are the firms in the construction sector. The represen-
tative firm decides how many houses to build (H) in each city and sell them at p Hm . For
each house the construction firm decides the combination of height (h) and lot size
(L) of the house to build, such that H = h ×L. The quantity of land used should not
exceed the potential spread of the city given by geographical or political constraints
(L̄m). The cost of the land is pLm . In addition to the land cost, the cost of building,
C(H), depends on the height of the housing unit to build. The cost of building high
is assumed to be convex: adding one more floor to a house lead to a more than pro-
portional increase in construction costs. This assumption is parametrized imposing
δ ≥ 1.35 While δ refers to the current technology to build higher, which is common
across cities, cm refers to a city-specific factor that influence the cost of height. The
problem of the firms in the construction sector follows.
max
H ,L
p Hm H −C (H)
s.t. H = h ×L; L ≤ L̄m
C (H) = cmhδL+pLmL; δ> 1
The solution of this problem gives rise to the height demand condition reported
in logarithm terms in Equation 6.
log (h) = 1
1−δ
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Markets should clear in equilibrium. The amount of labour hired by the firms
in production sector should be equal to the total population of the city (Nm). The de-
mand for consumption good equals its supply. Moreover, the housing market equilib-
rium requires that the total supply of houses, hL̄m , equalizes its demand, H N . From

















Using the spatial indifference (Equation 4), labour demand (Equation 5), and house
price equations (Equation 7) it is possible to derive three structural equations, de-
noted with *, that model the behaviour of house prices, wages and city population
in function of city-specific parameters: productivity (Am) and amenities (θm). Let’s
define K Pm , K
w
m , and K
N
m as constant terms that influences house prices, wages and
population respectively without passing through productivity and amenities. These
constant terms also include the effect of non-traded capital, the indirect utility value
and the potential land spread of the city given by geographical constraints.36 The
three structural equations are reported in Equations 8 to 10.
35Evidence for this assumption has been obtained by Ahlfeldt and McMillen (2015). In fact, they
conclude that a reasonable value for δ is 2.7, which is the inverse of elasticity of building height with
respect to land prices.
36We can derive the theoretical predictions of the effect of L̄. More potential land of the cities de-
creases house prices by increasing housing supply available in the city. Bigger land in the city increases






























The theoretical predictions of our model are that house prices increases if a city
becomes more productive or increases its amenities. Wages are positively affected by
productivity. A decrease in amenities in the city should be compensated by higher
wages in order to equalize utility at each location, ceteris paribus. Finally, city popu-
lation increases city productivity and amenities.
We assume that violent crime (V C ccm ) can have externality effects on city produc-
tivity and amenities that are not taken into account by actors.37 We assume that the
exogenous part of violent crime (V̂ C
cc
m ) has a log-linear influence on these parame-
ters. We define λA and λθ as the reduced form elasticities of productivity and ameni-
ties with respect to violent crime, respectively. We assume that city productivity and
amenities are further influenced by constant terms (K Am and K
θ
m) and any other non-
constant factor not related to violent crime which composes errors (µAm and µ
θ
m).














We are agnostic about the direction of the effects of violent crime on city-specific
parameters. Violent crime can in principle decrease city amenities because people
are not willing to live in a city with more crimes. Violent crimes can decrease produc-
tivity by influencing human capital accumulation of the population.
Our objective is then to obtain the direction of the effects of violent crime on city-
specific parameters that are in line with the estimated regressions of the city-wide
effects of violent crime on house prices, wages and city population using the strategy
proposed by Glaeser (2008). In order to do this we substitute Equations 11 to 12 into
the structural equations (Equations 8 to 10) to obtain the reduced form equations
that links violent crime to house prices, wages and city population (Equations 13 to









)= K wm +B w l og (V̂ C ccm )+µwm (14)
37The model can be expanded to include the effect of violent crime on total land spread because
for example it can influences zoning and regulation constraints. However, no result that we derive
depends on the assumption of no effect of violent crime on total land spread. This is similar to what





)= K Nm +B N log (V̂ C ccm )+µNm (15)
The reduced form elasticities of house prices, wages and city population with re-
spect to violent crime (the B coefficients) are reported in Equations 16 to 18. These
reduced forms coefficients depend on a set of parameters and on the reduced form
elasticities of productivity and amenities with respect to violent crime (the λ param-
eters). In particular, we have a set of three equations (B P , B w and B N ) and two un-
knowns (λA and λθ). If we know the reduced form elasticities of house prices, wages
and city population with respect to violent crime we can potentially recover the re-
duced form elasticities of productivity and amenities with respect to violent crime.
B P = (δ−1)λ
A +β (δ−1)λθ
αβ (δ−1)+δ(1−β−γ) (16)
B w = (δ−1)αλ
A −δ(1−β−γ)λθ
αβ (δ−1)+δ(1−β−γ) (17)
B N = [δ (1−α)+α]λ
A +δ(1−γ)λθ
αβ (δ−1)+δ(1−β−γ) (18)
The strategy proposed by Glaeser (2008) requires to first regress house prices, wages
and population of MSA on violent crime. In this way it is possible to estimate B̂ P , B̂ w ,
and B̂ N , the reduced form elasticities of house prices, wages and city population with
respect to violent crime. In order to obtain the effect of the exogenous part of vio-
lent crime on prices, wages and population we estimate Equations 13 to 15 using our
instrumental variable strategy. Moreover, we proxy the constant terms (K Pm , K
w
m , and
K Nm ) by MSA and year fixed effects. The fixed spread of cities is captured by the MSA
fixed effects. Moreover, we have demonstrated in Section 4.4 that our instrument is
not related to the area of a city. Fixed effects at city level also captures non-traded
capital. We also include Census Region time trends in our specification.38
Once we estimate B̂ P , B̂ w , and B̂ N we can recover the effect of violent crime on
productivity and amenities (λA and λθ) that rationalizes its city-wide effects using
Equations 19 and 20.
λA = (1−β−γ) B̂ N + (1−γ) B̂ w (19)
λθ =αB̂ P − B̂ w (20)
In our model we assume that agents are not heterogeneous. There exists an im-
portant literature explaining why people sort in different locations based on on their
productivity and valuation of amenities (see Combes et al., 2008). We do not suspect
that this important mechanism can bias our estimations since we have previously
demonstrated that the change in violent crime did not alter the distribution of people
between cities. Therefore, the estimated effects of violent crime on productivity and
amenities can be interpreted as the effect which is not caused by sorting.
38Because we compare cities inside the same Census regions our assumption of perfect mobility of
people is more likely to be satisfied.
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We assume some parameters in order to obtain the effect of violent crime on pro-
ductivity and amenities. We approximate the share of housing in utility (α) by the total
consumption expenditure to housing to be 0.3, obtained from the U.S. B.L.S. Con-
sumption Expenditure Survey. As for Glaeser (2008), we assume the share of labour
and traded capital in production function (β and γ) to be 0.6 and 0.3, respectively.
7.2 Estimating the externality effects
The strategy described in the previous section allows us to map reduced form elas-
ticities of the effect of violent crime on observable variables, such as house prices,
income and population in the MSA, on reduced form elasticities of the effect of vio-
lent crime on unobservable variables, such as productivity and amenities. That is, we
can understand how violent crime might have changed these unobservable variables
in a way that is consistent with the model reported in the previous section.
The effect of violent crime on the observable variables is reported in Table 15.
These results are slightly different from the results obtained in Section 7 because we
need to use a log-log specification in order to link these reduced forms to consider-
ations about the externality effects of violent crime on productivity and amenities.
However, we can still conclude that violent crime has a positive effect on city income,
and house prices, leaving population unchanged.
[INSERT TABLE 15 HERE]
Using Equations 19 to 20, we can recover how productivity and amenities should
have changed in order to rationalize the effect of violent crime on house prices, in-
come and population in the MSA. The calculated externality effects of violent crime
on productivity and amenities (λA and λθ) are reported in Table 16, column (2).39 We
find a negative and significant effect of violent crime on amenities (λθ) and a positive
effect on productivity (λA), with an elasticity of -0.0991 and 0.1243 respectively. Using
the theoretical predictions of our model if violent crime might affect amenities as a
result income should have increased as we found in Table 15. However, if amenities
would have been the only city-specific factor changing this should have been reflected
in lower house prices, an effect that we do not observe. Therefore, productivity should
have necessarily increased as a result of higher violent crimes.
[INSERT TABLE 16 HERE]
The estimates in Table 20 imply that the increase in violent crime in the city cen-
ter between 1960 and 1991 led to a decrease in the average amenities of the city of
23.2%.40 Using equation 4 we can see that this quantity corresponds to the percent-
age of the wage people would have been willing to sacrifice in 1991 to return to violent
crime rates in the city center as in 1960.
39Standard errors of the coefficients have been obtained using the following bootstrap technique.
This strategy consists in first bootstrapping a panel sample from our distribution of observations; sub-
sequently, we have estimated the elasticity of house prices, income and population to violent crime
and then compute the corresponding elasticity of amenities and productivity to violent crime; we have
replicated this procedure several times and obtained a distribution of these parameters and relevant
standard errors.
40Log violent crime in 1960 and 1991 was -7.08 and -4.73, respectively. We have computed the change
in average amenities between 1960 and 1991 multiplying the elasticity of amenities to violent crime,
-0.099, to the change in log violent crime in that period, 2.34.
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We now explore if these effects are due directly because of the effect of violent
crime or by the effect of other variables that were affected by violent crime and ul-
timately influenced productivity and amenities. In order to separate the real direct
effect of violent crime on city-specific factors we control for several possible mediat-
ing factors that we have found to be influenced by violent crime: highways, residential
suburbanization and employment centralization. The results are reported in Table 16,
columns (3) to (5), respectively. By controlling for these variables, we can partial out
the externality effect of violent crime which is not passing through these channels.
From Column (3) of Table 16 we can infer that, despite cities with more violent
crime lead to the creation of more highways, this last effect cannot explain why cities
have higher levels of productivity. The effect of violent crime on productivity which is
not passing through residential suburbanization is still positive, as it has been shown
in Column (4) of Table 16. Moreover, controlling for the effect of violent crime on res-
idential suburbanization we find a negative and stronger effect of violent crime on
city-amenities, with a calculated elasticity (λθ) of -0.1068. That is, if city centers in-
crease their violent crimes and people cannot suburbanize then the impact of violent
crime on amenities is negative.
Finally, when we control for employment decentralization we do not find any ex-
ternality effect of violent crime on unobservable variables (see Column (5) of Table
16). The elasticity of violent crime on productivity (λA) is now not significant and
equal to 0.1887. That is, the previous positive effect of violent crime on productivity
could be explained by the fact that violent crime led to a creation of different employ-
ment centers in the city and this could boost firm productivity. This might mean that
some firms were inefficiently located in the city center. Violent crime displaced firms
in the suburbs, and this displacement was productivity-enhancing. One possible ex-
planation for this result is that historically it might have been more efficient to have
firms in the city center. Modern cities might have a different optimal distribution of
firms in the city, for example as predicted by Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002).41 For
an individual firm it might not be optimal to move outside the city center, despite the
fact that productivity could increase if all firms coordinated this move outside of the
city center. Crime could have acted as a tax to firm location in city center that solved
this coordination failure by making people and firms move.
The coefficient of the effect of violent crime on amenities also turns to be insignif-
icant. The calculated elasticity of violent crime on amenities (λθ) is now -0.164. This
might be explained by the fact that part of the decrease in amenities in the city is ex-
plained by the fact that violent crime lead to employment to be located further away
from the center. As a result amenities could potentially decrease because of higher
traffic and congestion externalities.
8 Concluding remarks
In this paper we provide evidence of a debated mechanism that can explain why U.S.
cities suburbanized between the 1960s and the 1990s: the increase in violent crime in
41Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002) predict that cities in equilibrium should have a business center
in the CBD, and further away: residential, business, mixed use, business, and residential areas respec-
tively
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city centers. We estimate the causal effect of crime on suburbanization exploiting a
new instrument which combines time variation from national level of past lead poi-
soning and geographical variation from local soil quality. We find that an increase in
one standard deviation in violent crime decreased the share of population living in
the city center by 8 percentage points. We provide counterfactual evidence that if vi-
olent crime in city centers would have increased at the same rate as the suburbs then
the proportion of people living in city centers in the U.S. would have been constant
between 1960 and 1990.
The advantage of our empirical methodology is to be able to compare all the cities
in the U.S. for many decades by exploiting a standardized measure, such as the pH of
the soil of a city. The use of lead poisoning as time variation of our instrument has the
convenience that it can be employed to predict both the big rise of American crimes
between the 1960s and the 1990s and the fall afterwards. More micro-evidence should
be provided to show the link between resuspended lead and blood lead levels. This
can contribute to the discussion about how much of the crime variation in the U.S.
can be explained by lead poisoning.
Further research should be dedicated to the study of the big fall of crimes after the
1990s. In particular, it is crucial to understand why suburbanization did not revert
when crimes decreased and what are the mechanisms behind the persistence in sub-
urbanization. One possibility is that the flight from city centers affected amenities in
the suburbs by increasing school and housing quality.
Additionally, the interaction between lead poisoning and soil quality can poten-
tially provide quasi-experimental variation that can be used to understand the effect
of crime on many other outcomes. Furthermore, our methodology could be also eas-
ily applicable to other countries. Expanding the context of analysis to European coun-
tries it might possible to understand the importance of several other urban amenities
and characteristics to explain suburbanization.
The results we find are important in order to understand how much urban ameni-
ties and productivity can explain location of people and firms inside cities. Using a
spatial equilibrium model we infer that the increase of violent crimes created impor-
tant spillover effects at city level by reducing the overall level of city amenities. In-
equalities in cities with higher crimes also increased and racial location segregation
happened because of white people moving to the suburbs. The model we exploit in
this paper can potentially be expanded in the future in order to assess how ameni-
ties react differently between suburbs and city centers after violent crimes increased.
Another possible extension of the model is to make the land spread of the city endoge-
nous to disentangle the different theoretical effects of crime and suburbanization.
We provide suggestive evidence that the job decentralization caused by higher vi-
olent crimes in the city center is the responsible for increasing city productivity. This
is consistent with a situation where it is optimal for firms to move to the suburbs
but they do not because of coordination failures. Violent crime potentially provide a
common shock that solves this sub-optimality. This result points to the fact that cities
could achieve gains in productivity by using incentives to move firms to the suburbs.
Further research should be devoted in incorporating this coordination failure in our
model and show the gains of different employment centers inside cities.
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Figure 1: Correlation between violent crime per capita and proportion of people living in the
city center
Panel a): Time series share population living in city center (CC), left y axis, and violent crime per capita in city center, right y axis. Panel b): Scatter plot change share
population living in city center (CC) between 1961 and 1991 against change violent crime per capita in city center.
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Figure 2: Time series of violent crime rates per capita and the consumption of tetraethyl lead
19 years before
Upward x axis: time series of tonnes of lead consumed in U.S. as gasoline additive. Downward x axis: time series of violent crime per capita in city center
Figure 3: Average marginal effect of tetraethyl lead at different pH values
Marginal effects derived after regressing violent crime per capita in city centers on tetraethyl lead, tetraethyl lead x pH, tetraethyl lead x pH2, and tetraethyl lead x pH3.
Robust standard errors have been used clustered at city level. Marginal effects reported for value of pH between the 10th and 99th percentile. p-value joint significance
polynomials: p-value for the test of joint significance of the coefficients of the following regressors: tetraethyl lead x pH, tetraethyl lead x pH2, and tetraethyl lead x pH3.




Figure 4: Coefficients and F-statistics of the first stage regression for every possible pH interval
Panel a): Coefficients of first stage regression. Panel b): F-statistics of first stage regression. Coefficient and F-statistic of the excluded instrument derived after regressing
violent crime per capita on city and year fixed effects and the interaction between tetraethyl lead 19 years before and the soil quality index. Every different circle refers to a
different regression for every possible minimum and maximum level of pH. Robust standard errors have been used. The size of the circles refer to the absolute value of the
coefficient or F-stat with respect to the coefficient or F-stat in the same category (- and sign.: negative and signficant, + and sign: positive and significant, n.s.: non
significant). Dashed lines indicate our chosen soil quality index: pH between 6.8 and 7.7
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Figure 5: First stage using different lags of national lead poisoning
Left y axis: coefficient of the first stage estimate. Right y axis: F-statistics of the relevance of the instrument. For each possible lag of national lead (X), coefficient obtained
after regressing violent crime per capita in the city center on MSA, year and Census division times year fixed effects and the interaction between a dummy taking 1 if pH is
between 6.8 and 7.7 and the tonnes of lead consumed in U.S. as gasoline additive X years before, normalized by the maximum level of tetraethyl lead consumption.
F-statistics obtained as the F-statistics of the instrument in this regression.
Figure 6: Time series of violent crime per capita in city center by good and bad soil
City centers with good soil: pH between 6.8 and 7.7. City centers with bad soil: pH outside the interval between 6.8 and 7.7.
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Figure 7: Map of city centers with good and bad soils for lead adsorption
City centers with good soil: pH between 6.8 and 7.7. City centers with bad soil: pH outside the interval between 6.8 and 7.7. The map reports the U.S. Census Divisions
Figure 8: Time series of the effect of the good soil index on crime and time series of lagged
tetraethyl lead
Coefficients obtained regressing violent crime per capita on the interaction between the good soil dummy and year dummies, controlling for city, year and Census
division times year fixed effects. Standard errors have been clustered at Census Division level. Lower bound CI 10: lower bound confidence interval at 10 % significance
level. Higher bound CI 10: higher bound confidence interval at 10 % significance level. City centers with good soil: pH between 6.8 and 7.7. Lead: tonnes of lead
consumed in U.S. as gasoline additive 19 years before, normalized by the maximum level of tetraethyl lead consumption. 1960 year dummy has been omitted. Robust
standard errors have been used. Left y axis: effect of the good soil index on crime. Right y axis: time series of lagged tetraethyl lead.
42
Figure 9: Counterfactual proportion of people in city center in MSA if violent crime in city
center would not have increased from 1960 and if violent crime in city center would have
increased from 1960 as in the suburbs
Real: actual time series of proportion of people in city center in MSA. Counter. no incr in VC in CC: counterfactual proportion of people in city center in MSA if violent
crime (VC) in city center (CC) would not have increased from 1960 with corresponding 95 % confidence interval. Obtained subtracting the actual increase in violent crime
from one year in the city center to another multiplied by the causal effect of crime on suburbanization from the actual suburbanization measure. Counter. incr in VC as
NCC: counterfactual proportion of people in city center in MSA if violent crime in city center would have increased from 1960 as in the suburbs (NCC) with corresponding
95 % confidence interval. Obtained subtracting the actual difference in change in violent crime from one year to another in the city center with respect to the suburbs
multiplied by the causal effect of crime on suburbanization from the actual suburbanization measure. VC: Violent crime per capita. CC (NCC): city center (suburbs). l.b:
Lower bound confidence. u.b.: upper bound confidence.
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9.2 Tables
Table 1: First stage using different fixed effects and time trends for all the years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Violent crime Violent crime Violent crime Violent crime Violent crime
Good soil x Lead -0.00184*** -0.00528*** -0.00451*** -0.00327*** -0.00276***
(0.000190) (0.000326) (0.000363) (0.000378) (0.000400)
Observations 9,515 9,515 9,484 9,484 9,363
R-squared 0.005 0.757 0.763 0.771 0.832
MSA FE NO YES YES YES YES
Year FE NO YES YES YES YES
C. reg X Year FE NO NO YES NO NO
C. div X Year FE NO NO NO YES NO
State X Year FE NO NO NO NO YES
Year 60-91 60-91 60-91 60-91 60-91
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
F 262.16 154.46 74.80 47.78
For the notes see Table 2
Table 2: First stage using different fixed effects and time trends for Census Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Violent crime Violent crime Violent crime Violent crime Violent crime
Good soil x Lead -0.00206*** -0.00721*** -0.00556*** -0.00396*** -0.00325**
(0.000611) (0.00120) (0.00134) (0.00140) (0.00145)
Observations 1,190 1,189 1,185 1,185 1,170
R-squared 0.004 0.744 0.752 0.758 0.831
MSA FE NO YES YES YES YES
Year FE NO YES YES YES YES
C. reg X Year FE NO NO YES NO NO
C. div X Year FE NO NO NO YES NO
State X Year FE NO NO NO NO YES
Year CY 60-90 CY 60-90 CY 60-90 CY 60-90 CY 60-90
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
F 36.11 17.29 7.99 5.01
Violent crime: Violent crime per capita in the city center. Good soil x Lead: dummy taking 1 if pH in the city center is between 6.8 and 7.7 multiplied by tonnes of lead
consumed in U.S. as gasoline additive 19 years before, normalized by the maximum level of tetraethyl lead consumption. C. reg: Census region. C. div: Census division
fixed effects. CY: Census year. F: F-statistics on the excluded instrument. Robust standard errors have been used. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Table 3: Balancing test for economic, social and geographic characteristics
Variable Average Levels Trends
All US Inside Division All US Inside Division
Area CC (50) 27.51 3.52 0.98 . .
Area MSA (50) 2056.36 708.11 -424.82 . .
Share Pop. CC (50 - 60) 0.47 0.09?? 0.02 0.05?? 0.01
Population CC (50 - 60) 2.0e+05 -7.7e+04 -1438.35 32129.34? 6486.92
Population MSA (50 - 60) 4.3e+05 -1.7e+05 1842.98 30009.88 40253.98
Pop. Density CC (50 - 60) 6109.20 -1535.46??? 30.86 327.39 151.63
Pop. Density MSA (50 - 60) 197.35 -105.09??? -8.35 12.44 27.83
Violent Crime Rate CC (per 10000) (60 - 63) 13.82 -2.17 -0.34 -0.46 0.38
Murder Rate CC (per 10000) (60 - 63) 0.53 -0.11 0.01 -0.05 -0.04
Rape Rate CC (per 10000) (60 - 63) 0.70 0.06 -0.00 0.10 0.15
Robbery Rate CC (per 10000) (60 - 63) 4.71 0.43 -0.15 -0.27 0.19
Agg. Assault Rate CC (per 10000) (60 - 63) 7.89 -2.55?? -0.21 -0.29 0.08
Burglary Rate CC (per 10000) (60 - 63) 59.64 5.28 1.28 -0.54 -2.17
Larceny Rate CC (per 10000)(60 - 63) 169.71 78.02??? 29.73 -10.26 -18.26?
Vehicle Theft Rate CC (per 10000) (60 - 63) 22.91 2.75 -1.78 0.24 -0.13
Total Crimes CC (per 10000) (60 - 63) 266.43 83.87??? 28.82 -9.56 -17.52
Median Gross Rent (housing unit) MSA (60) 384.91 26.96?? 22.12? . .
Median Single Family House Value MSA (60) 64628.31 4839.84? 2297.45 . .
Median Family Income CC (50-60) 22811.72 1995.89??? 1246.13? 87.89 -618.41
Median Family Income MSA (50-60) 21400.64 1837.63??? 1236.50? -319.70 -428.57
Annual Precipitation (77) 35.86 -19.38??? -8.86??? . .
% Possible Sun (77) 59.93 7.91??? 2.60 . .
Average Jan Temp (77) 34.34 -1.49 -3.20 . .
Average July Temp (77) 75.76 0.25 -0.12 . .
% Blacks CC (60) 13.41 -7.81??? -1.21 . .
% Blacks MSA (60) 9.45 -5.47??? -1.49 . .
% Foreign CC (60) 16.40 -0.41 -0.70 . .
% Foreign MSA (60) 14.47 0.70 -0.07 . .
Distance Border or Coast 129.89 139.60??? 35.60 . .
Unemployment Rate MSA (60) 5.17 0.26 0.20 . .
Labor Force Civilian MSA (50-60) 0.39 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00
Emp. Rate MSA (50-60) 36.99 -1.18 0.26 0.21 -0.40
Emp. Rate Agriculture MSA (50-60) 3.44 0.57 0.54 -0.07 -0.01
Emp. Rate Business Services MSA (50) 2.29 0.50??? 0.30?? . .
Emp. Rate Construction MSA (50-60) 2.51 0.63??? 0.19 -0.06 0.09
Emp. Rate Education MSA (60) 2.18 -0.02 -0.16 . .
Emp. Rate Finance MSA (50-60) 1.17 0.15? 0.01 0.07? 0.03
Emp. Rate Government MSA (60) 1.82 0.29? -0.03 . .
Emp. Rate Manufacturing MSA (50-60) 9.18 -5.52??? -1.52?? 0.82??? -0.04
Emp. Rate Mining MSA (50) 0.44 0.47 0.52 . .
Emp. Rate Professional MSA (50) 3.53 0.10 -0.31 . .
Median Age MSA (50-60) 29.49 -0.93? -0.29 -1.01??? -0.39
% Over 65y MSA (50-60) 7.81 -0.94?? -0.64 -0.50? -0.32
% Non-white MSA (50-60) 9.98 -5.17??? -1.77 0.50? 0.40
% Pub. Transportation to Work MSA (60) 6.82 -4.04??? -2.83??? . .
Median Years of School MSA (50-60) 9.57 1.42??? 0.69?? -0.13 -0.01
CC interstate rays (50-60) 0.04 -0.05?? -0.08? 0.17 -0.03
CC total rays (50-60) 0.04 -0.05?? -0.08? 0.17 -0.03
2-digit CC rays (50-60) 0.03 -0.03?? -0.05 0.20 -0.08
All interstate CC rays (50-60) 0.03 -0.03?? -0.05 0.22 -0.02
Federally funded CC rays (50-60) 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.26 -0.00
All rays in MSA (50-60) 0.06 -0.07??? -0.06 -0.08 -0.20
2-digit ray in MSA (50-60) 0.06 -0.07??? -0.05 -0.06 -0.23
Federally funded rays in MSA (50-60) 0.03 -0.03? -0.06 0.11 -0.19
Rays in plan running through MSA 2.10 -0.24 -0.46? . .
Rays in plan running through CC 1.90 -0.01 -0.32 . .
Years in parenthesis refer to first year in which the data are present and if a second number is present it represents the year in which the trend coefficient has been taken.
Average: average value of the variable in the first year in which the variable is present. Levels, all U.S.: coefficient obtained regressing the variable in consideration on the
good soil dummy. Levels, inside Division: coefficient obtained regressing the variable in consideration on the good soil dummy, controlling for Census Division fixed
effects. Trend, all U.S.: coefficient obtained regressing the variable in consideration on the good soil dummy interacted by the year in which the trend coefficient has been
taken, controlling for the interaction by the good soil dummy and the all the other years and omitting the interaction between by the good soil dummy and the first year in
which the variable is present. Trend, inside Division: coefficient obtained regressing the variable in consideration on the good soil dummy interacted by the year in which
the trend coefficient has been taken, controlling for Census Division fixed effects interacted by year fixed effects, the interaction by the good soil dummy and the all the
other years and omitting the interaction between by the good soil dummy and the first year in which the variable is present. Robust standard errors are always used. CC:
city center. MSA: metropolitan statistical area. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Baseline results: The effect of crime on suburbanization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Share Pop CC Violent crime Share Pop CC Share Pop CC Share Pop CC ln(Pop CC)
Violent crime -0.0165*** -0.0717*** -0.0843*** -0.257***
(0.00141) (0.0121) (0.0167) (0.0718)
Good soil x Lead -0.914*** 0.0686***
(0.0649) (0.00885)
Observations 9,481 9,484 9,481 9,716 9,481 9,484
R-squared 0.960 0.758 0.956 0.934
MSA FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
C. div x Year NO NO NO NO YES YES
Year 60-91 60-91 60-91 60-91 60-91 60-91
Estimation OLS OLS IV OLS IV IV
F . . 264.55 . 77.32 76.96
Share Pop CC: Proportion of MSA population living in city center. Violent crime: Violent crime per capita in the city center
standardized. Good soil x Lead: dummy taking 1 if pH in the city center is between 6.8 and 7.7 multiplied by tonnes of lead
consumed in U.S. as gasoline additive 19 years before, normalized by the maximum level of tetraethyl lead consumption. C.
div: Census Division fixed effects. F: Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistics on the excluded instruments. Standard errors clustered at
Census division times year level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: The effect of crime on population displacement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Log Pop MSA Log Pop CC Log Pop NCC Blacks MSA Blacks CC
Violent crime 0.0661 -0.257*** 0.144*** 0.137 4.730***
(0.0428) (0.0718) (0.0534) (0.809) (0.795)
Observations 9,481 9,484 9,481 921 916
MSA FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
C. div x Year YES YES YES NO NO
C. reg x Year NO NO NO YES YES
Year 60-91 60-91 60-91 CY 60-90 CY 60-90
Estimation IV IV IV IV IV
F 77.06 76.96 77.06 13.29 12.78
Violent crime: Violent crime per capita in the city center standardized. Pop MSA: Population in the MSA. Pop CC: Population in
the city center. Pop NCC: Population in the suburbs. C. div: Census Division fixed effects. C. reg: Census Region fixed effects. F:
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistics on the excluded instruments. Standard errors clustered at Census division times year level
(columns 1-3) and Census region times year level (columns 4-5) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: The effect of crime on proportion of MSA employment in central city county
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All Manuf Wholesale Retail Finance Other serv
Violent crime -0.0108 -0.0462*** -0.0244* -0.0386*** 0.00283 -0.0285***
(0.0113) (0.0163) (0.0143) (0.0148) (0.0178) (0.0103)
Observations 5,334 5,334 5,334 5,334 5,334 5,334
MSA FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
C. div x Year YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year 74-91 74-91 74-91 74-91 74-91 74-91
Estimation IV IV IV IV IV IV
F 19.37 19.37 19.37 19.37 19.37 19.37
Violent crime: Violent crime per capita in the city center standardized. Dependent variable is proportion of MSA employment
of SIC industry under consideration in county of the city center. All: all SIC employment. Manuf: Manufacturing; Wholesale:
Wholesale Trade; Retail: Retail Trade; Finance: Finance, Insurance, And Real Estate; Other serv: Services). MSA with a unique
county have missing values of employment proportion. C. div: Census Division fixed effects. F: Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistics
on the excluded instruments. Standard errors clustered at Census division times year level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
Table 7: Timing of residential and employment decentralization
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Share Manuf CC Share Manuf CC Share Pop CC Share Pop CC
Violent crime -0.0241*** -0.0181 -0.0276*** -0.0478***
(0.00863) (0.0187) (0.00631) (0.0127)
Share Pop CC (10 years lag) 0.0656***
(0.0241)
Share Manuf CC (10 years lag) 0.0256
(0.0185)
Observations 5,352 5,332 5,367 2,344
MSA FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Good Soil x Lead 29 years lag NO YES NO YES
Year 74-91 74-91 74-91 74-91
Estimation IV IV IV IV
F 74.24 15.32 76.87 19.57
Violent crime: Violent crime per capita in the city center standardized. Share Pop CC: Proportion of MSA population living in
city center.Share Manuf CC: proportion of MSA employment of manufacturing industry under consideration in county of the
city center. MSA with a unique county have missing values of employment proportion. F: Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistics on
the excluded instruments. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Profile of recent suburbanized population in 1980
Variable Recent suburbanized Difference wrt people staying in CC
Mean age 31.03 -2.86???
Mean number children 0.67 0.10???
Prop. married 0.62 0.09???
Prop. white 0.85 0.16???
Prop. black 0.11 -0.15???
Prop. high school or higher 0.63 0.14???
Prop. high school or higher of whites 0.64 0.11???
Prop. employed 0.55 0.11???
Prop. unemployed 0.03 -0.00???
Prop. people not working in CC 0.24 0.21???
Mean occupational score 18.69 4.18???
Prop.: Proportion. Recent suburbanized refers to people who in 1980 lives in a not central city in the metropolitan area and in the previous five years they were living in
the central city of the same metropolitan area. Difference with respect to people staying in CC has been obtained regressing the variable under interested on a variable
indicating whether the person is a recent suburbanized or he continues to live in the central city for the sample of people living in metropolitan areas. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 9: Heterogeneous effects of correlation between crime rates and proportion blacks liv-
ing in city center
(1)
VARIABLES Violent crime
Prop. Blacks CC 0.000379***
(8.11e-05)
Prop. Blacks CC x Rays CC -3.10e-05**
(1.10e-05)






C. reg X Year FE YES
Year CY 60-90
Estimation OLS
Violent crime: Violent crime per capita in the city center. Prop. Blacks CC: proportion of black population in city center in the MSA. Rays CC: number of highway rays
passing through the city center, source: Baum-Snow (2007). Lead: tonnes of lead consumed in U.S. as gasoline additive 19 years before, normalized by the maximum level
of tetraethyl lead consumption. C. reg: Census region fixed effects. CY: census years. Standard errors clustered at Census region times year level in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10: Effect of interaction good soil and different lag of past leads on education outcomes
and crime
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Share high school Share high school
Good soil x Lead (9 years before) -0.546 -0.546
(0.708) (1.860)
Good soil x Lead (19 years before) 0.699 0.699
(1.895) (4.270)




MSA FE YES YES
Year FE YES YES
C. reg x Year YES YES
Year CY 60-90 CY 60-90
Estimation OLS OLS
s.e. cluster MSA C. reg x Year
Violent crime: Violent crime per capita in the city center. Share high school: share of population with high school diploma in the MSA. Good soil x Lead (X years before):
dummy taking 1 if pH in the city center is between 6.8 and 7.7 multiplied by tonnes of lead consumed in U.S. as gasoline additive X years before, normalized by the
maximum level of tetraethyl lead consumption. CY: Census years. C. reg: Census region fixed effects. CY: census years. s.e. cluster: cluster level of the standard errors.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 11: Results controlling for different lagged effect of education level
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Share pop CC Share pop CC Share pop CC
Violent crime -0.0591*** -0.0781***
(0.00678) (0.0289)
Good soil x Lead (29 years before) -0.0166
(0.0208)
Share high school MSA -0.0105**
(0.00426)
Observations 9,481 9,481 939
MSA FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
C. reg x Year FE YES YES YES
Year 60-91 60-91 CY 60-90
Estimation IV IV IV
F 156.25 5.52 50.54
For the notes see Table 12. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 12: Results controlling for instrumented education level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Sh. pop CC V. crime Sh. pop CC H.s. MSA V. crime Sh. pop CC H.s. MSA V. crime
Violent crime -0.0686*** -0.0611*** -0.0827***
(0.0214) (0.0120) (0.0232)
Share high school MSA -0.00183 0.000998
(0.00198) (0.00245)
Good soil x Lead -0.957*** -7.135*** -1.024*** -7.008*** -1.018***
(0.192) (1.906) (0.211) (1.964) (0.213)
H.s. U.S. x age school entry 0.0131*** -0.00259**
(0.00164) (0.000899)
H.s. U.S. x age school leave 0.00713*** -0.000962*
(0.00116) (0.000544)
Observations 1,184 1,185 917 935 1,181 917 935 1,181
MSA FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
C. reg x Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year CY 60-90 CY 60-90 CY 60-90 CY 60-90 CY 60-90 CY 60-90 CY 60-90 CY 60-90
Estimation IV OLS IV OLS OLS IV OLS OLS
F 17.51 . 12.24 . . 7.97 . .
Sh pop CC: Proportion of MSA population living in city center. V. crime: Violent crime per capita in the city center standardized.
Good soil x Lead: dummy taking 1 if pH in the city center is between 6.8 and 7.7 multiplied by tonnes of lead consumed in U.S.
as gasoline additive 19 years before, normalized by the maximum level of tetraethyl lead consumption. Share high school MSA:
Percentage of people with high school diploma in the MSA. H.s. U.S.: Percentage of people with high school diploma in the U.S.
Age school entry: state age school of entry in 1910. Age school leave: State minimum age school leave in 1910. C. reg: Census
Region fixed effects. CY: Census Year. F: F-statistics on the excluded instruments. Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical value at 10%
maximal IV size: 7.03. Standard errors clustered at Census region times year level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 13: Effect of violent crime on MSA population, house prices, and income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Pop. MSA H. rent MSA H. price MSA Inc MSA Inc MSA
Violent crime 95,144 57.94*** 21,690** 3,422** 836.2*
(68,244) (16.58) (8,838) (1,252) (449.5)
Observations 921 921 920 921 917
MSA FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
C. reg x Year YES YES YES YES YES
Year CY 60-90 CY 60-90 CY 60-90 CY 60-90 CY 60-90
Controls . . . . Education
Estimation IV IV IV IV IV
F 13.29 13.29 13.41 13.29 12.24
Violent crime: Violent crime per capita in the city center standardized. Pop MSA: Population in the MSA. H. rent MSA: Median
gross rent per housing unit in the MSA. H. price MSA: Median single family house value. Inc MSA: Median family income in the
MSA. Control for education: control for the percentage of people with high school diploma in the MSA instrumented by the
state age school of entry in 1910 multiplied by the overall percentage of people with high school diploma in the U.S. CY: Census
years. C. reg: Census Region fixed effects. F: F-statistics on the excluded instruments. Standard errors clustered at Census
region times year level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 14: Effect of violent crime on MSA inequalities and transportation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Gini MSA Inc CC/MSA Inc CC Highway CC Pub transp MSA
Violent crime 0.00613** -0.0945*** -358.3 0.255* -2.212**
(0.00243) (0.0210) (1,394) (0.135) (0.946)
Observations 921 921 921 921 921
MSA FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
C. reg x Year YES YES YES YES YES
Year CY 60-90 CY 60-90 CY 60-90 CY 60-90 CY 60-90
Estimation IV IV IV IV IV
F 13.29 13.29 13.29 13.29 13.29
Violent crime: Violent crime per capita in the city center standardized. Inc CC/MSA: ratio between the median family income
in the city center (CC) and the median family income in the MSA. Inc CC: median family income in the city center. Gini MSA:
Simulated Gini coefficient from Baum-Snow (2007). Pub trans MSA: percentage of people using public transport to get to work.
Highway CC: highway rays built passing through city center. CY: Census years. C. reg: Census Region fixed effects. F: F-statistics
on the excluded instruments. Standard errors clustered at Census region times year level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
Table 15: Elasticities of house rents, income and population with respect to violent crime
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Log h. rent MSA Log income MSA Log Pop. MSA
Log violent crime 0.193** 0.157* 0.145
(0.0836) (0.0880) (0.141)
Observations 918 918 918
R-squared 0.830 0.838 0.990
MSA FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
C. reg x Year YES YES YES
Year CY 60-90 CY 60-90 CY 60-90
Estimation IV IV IV
Cluster s.e. MSA MSA MSA
F 11.69 11.69 11.69
H. rent MSA: Median gross rent per housing unit in the MSA. Income MSA: Median family income in the MSA. Pop. MSA: Total
population in the MSA. Violent crime: Violent crime per capita in the city center standardized. C. reg: Census Region fixed
effects. CY: Census Year. F: F-statistics on the excluded instruments. Standard errors clustered at Census region times year level
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 16: Elasticities of amenities and productivity with respect to violent crime
Control for mediation
Coefficient None Highways Resid suburbanization Empl centralization
λθ -0.0991** -0.0972** -0.1068** -0.164
(0.04551) (0.04371) (0.04552) (0.6082)
λA 0.1243** 0.1219** 0.1260** 0.1887
(0.05242) (0.04991) (0.05111) (0.62977)
λθ : elasticity of city amenities with respect to violent crime. λA : elasticity of city productivity with respect to violent crime.
Control for mediation, highways: the estimated regression also includes the number of highways passing through the MSA.
Control for mediation, resid suburbanization: the estimated regression also includes the proportion of population in MSA
living in city center. Control for mediation, empl centralization: the estimated regression also includes the proportion of
employment in MSA located in the central county. Standard errors have been bootstrapped: this strategy consists in first
bootstrapping a panel sample from our distribution of observations; subsequently, we have estimated the elasticity of house
prices, income and population to violent crime and then compute the corresponding elasticity of amenities and productivity to
violent crime; we have replicated this procedure several times and obtained a distribution of these parameters and relevant
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